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Cameras in the Courtroom: Guidelines for 
State Criminal Trials 
In 1965, only two states permitted photographic and electronic 
media coverage1 of courtroom proceedings.2 Today, forty-three states 
permit television coverage of their appellate and/ or trial proceedings 
on an experimental or permanent basis. 3 This development has not 
come about in a systematic or uniform fashion. Lacking guidance 
from the federal courts, the states have independently conducted ex-
periments and adopted their own guidelines in an attempt to accom-
modate the conflicting constitutional4 and policy interests5 involved. 
The development of state guidelines6 has stemmed largely from the 
belief that media self-discipline is insufficient to ensure fair treatment 
1. The phrase "photographic and electronic media coverage," referred to herein as "televis-
ing" or "broadcasting," includes both the acquisition of information (through devices such as 
still news photography, audio taping, motion picture filming and videotaping), and the public 
dissemination and broadcast of that information. See Final Report of the Hawaii State Bar Asso-
ciation Committee on "Cameras in the Courtroom," 17 HAWAII B.J. 3, 4 n.1 (1982) [hereinafter 
cited as Hawaii Report]. 
2. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965) ("Forty-eight of our States and the Federal 
Rules have deemed the use of television improper in the courtroom."). 
3. See RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS AssN., NEWS MEDIA COVERAGE OF JUDI-
CIAL PROCEEDINGS WITH CAMERAS AND MICROPHONES at B-1 (Jan. 8, 1986) [hereinafter cited 
as RTNDA] ("Thirty-two States have permanent rules permitting extended media coverage; 
fourteen States have experimental coverage rules. Kansas, Minnesota, and New Jersey have both 
experimental and permanent rules."). The jurisdictions that presently prohibit any extended me-
dia coverage are the District of Columbia, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, South Caro-
lina, South Dakota, and Virginia. Id. at B-2. Copies of the RTNDA survey and the many state 
reports evaluating courtroom broadcasting can be obtained from RTNDA, 1735 DeSales St., 
N.W., Washington, DC 20036. 
Cases upholding the trial judge's decision to allow televising or photographing of the trial 
include Gonzales v. People, 165 Colo. 322, 326, 438 P.2d 686, 687-88 (1968); Patten v. State, 467 
So. 2d 975, 979 (Fla.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 198 (1985); Maxwell v. State, 443 So. 2d 967, 969-
70 (Fla. 1983); King v. State, 390 So. 2d 315, 318 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981); 
In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., 370 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Fla. Report]; 
Palm Beach Newspapers v. State, 378 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Johnson, 
318 N.W.2d 417, 424-25 (Iowa), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 848 (1982); State v. Newsome, 177 N.J. 
Super. 221, 228-29, 426 A.2d 68, 72-73 (App. Div. 1980); State v. Rogers, 17 Ohio St. 3d 174, 
184-85, 478 N.E.2d 984, 994-95, vacated on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985); State ex rel 
Grinnell Communications Corp. v. Love, 62 Ohio St. 2d 399, 406 N.E.2d 809 (1980) (per 
curiam); State v. Jessup, 31 Wash. App. 304, 641 P.2d 1185, 1194 (1982). 
4. The constitutional provisions implicated in the cameras in the courtroom debate include 
the first amendment, the sixth amendment, and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Part I infra. 
5. See Part II infra. 
6. Because of inherent pressures on elected judges, it is wiser to establish restrictive and 
comprehensive guidelines than to grant a judge absolute discretion to impose restrictions on 
broadcasters once in the courtroom. See R. CHAPIN, UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE FOR ALL COURTS 28 (1983) ("Rules that limit discretion are an important safeguard 
against the abuse of power. When judges ..• have too much discretion, the criminal justice 
system violates the American ideal of a system of laws and not of men."). Television offers 
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of trial participants and preserve courtroom decorum. 7 The states' in-
dependent experimentation in this area, however, has produced a large 
variety of guidelines that approach the problem in markedly different 
ways. A uniform set of guidelines for televising state criminal trials is 
needed to safeguard the rights of courtroom participants and promote 
the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system. 8 
This Note analyzes the conflicting interests involved in televising 
state criminal trials and proposes a model set of guidelines for consid-
eration by states that decide to permit electronic media in their court-
rooms. The Note favors restrictions on broadcasters once in the 
courtroom and advocates that the defendant's right to a fair trial re-
ceive more scrupulous protection than the broadcast media's interest 
in attendance and the public's "right to know." Part I presents the 
constitutional principles with which any set of guidelines must com-
ply. Part II analyzes the policy considerations that should guide the 
judges an excellent vehicle both to acco=odate the press and to impress the voters. Such pres-
sures are likely to influence judges to favor the press over the defendant. 
Superior Court Judge Henry S. Stevens told the ABA committee considering revisions of 
canon 35, see note 39 infra, in 1962, "Woe be unto that judge who has sufficient courage to 
exclude photography in a celebrated case. I venture to say he will not be dealt with in a kindly 
manner by the press. I know from bitter experience that disfavor with the press can be a pretty 
rough ordeal." E. GERALD, NEWS OF CRIME: COURTS AND PRESS IN CONFLICT 156 (1983); 
see also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548-49 (1965); Callahan v. Lash, 381 F. Supp. 827, 833 
(N.D. Ind. 1974) (acknowledging the adverse psychological effect of television on judges, particu-
larly elected judges); Gerbner, Trial by Television: Are We at the Point of No Return?, 63 JUDI· 
CATURE 416, 424 (1979) ("It is difficult to remain oblivious to the pressures that the news media 
can bring to bear on [trial judges] both directly and through the shaping of public opinion.") 
(quoting Estes, 381 U.S. at 548-49); REPORT OF THE MINNESOTA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM TO THE SUPREME COURT 11 (1982) ("[R]ather strong evidence 
of real lapses in good taste and in concern for the sensibilities of individuals [by the media] was 
brought to the attention of the Commission, including specific evidence of rather poor taste di-
rected against the presiding judge when rulings adverse to the media were made by him.") [here-
inafter cited as MINN. REPORT]; "Television in the Courtroom -Limited Benefits, Vital Risks?': 
3 COM. & THE L. 35, 40-41 (1981) (proceedings of the Educational Conference presented by 
Allied Educational Foundation, Sept. 16, 1980) ("State judges, who must run for reelection, are 
also not immune from the pressures of public opinion. In criminal cases they are often forced to 
make unpopular decisions. Whatever else may be said of the quality of the judges who preside 
over our lower criminal courts, many have displayed a fine instinct for avoiding unpopular deci-
sions. Being 'on camera' will not curb that instinct but rather may encourage further dereliction 
of duty.") [hereinafter cited as "Television in the Courtroom'1· Since ajudge's discretion is likely 
to be influenced by media pressure, it is important to restrict the influence of the media over the 
trial process, see Gaines & Stuplinski, Should Trials be Televised, Broadcast, Photographed? 
"No" Says the Greater Cleveland Bar Association, 49 CLEV. B.J. 296, 297 (1978). 
7. [T]elevision newscasters are not accredited members of any bar association, or any 
related profession, are not licensed by Government, or restricted by a legal code of ethics. 
They do have the free choice to edit, capsulize, dramatize, sensationalize any issue to satisfy 
the most basic public appetite in order to generate commercial demand. 
"Television in the Courtroom': supra note 6, at 36 (Statement ofG. Barasch, Conference Chair-
man); see Bollinger, The Press and the Public Interest: An Essay on the Relationship Between 
Social Behavior and the Language of First Amendment Theory, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1457 
(1984) ("The press in this country appears to be somewhat uncomfortable with any sense of itself 
as an institution made up of 'professionals.' "); Friendly, National News Council Will Dissolve, 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1984, at 11, col. 1 (city ed.); MINN. REPORT, supra note 6, at 17. 
8. See the discussion of uniformity, Part III. B infra. 
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formulation of state guidelines, and concludes that sound public policy 
requires that the interests of the accused be placed above those of the 
broadcasters. Part III discusses the manner in which the states have 
resolved these difficult constitutional and policy questions, noting 
those resolutions that best accommodate the principles outlined in 
Parts I and II. Part III also discusses the desirability of promulgating 
a uniform set of guidelines for application by the states. States are 
then invited to adopt the model set of guidelines proposed in the 
Appendix.9 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PARAMETERS 
The Supreme Court has had two occasions to address the question 
of whether the televising of a state criminal trial violates the defen-
dant's fourteenth amendment right to due process oflaw. In 1965, the 
Court held in Estes v. Texas10 that the circus-like atmosphere created 
by broadcasters in the courtroom deprived the defendant of due pro-
cess. I I Indeed, in reversing Estes' conviction for swindling, four mem-
bers of the five-Justice majorityI2 endorsed the principle that the 
televising of criminal trials, at least under the technology prevailing at 
the time, I3 amounted to a per se violation of due process. I4 
It was not until 1981 that the Court once again considered the 
question, this time in a case in which Florida's guidelines for televising 
9. Judge Murray Richtel of the Twentieth Judicial District of Colorado is currently drafting 
a similar set of guidelines for the National Conference of State Trial Judges. He is chairman of 
the News Reporting and Fair Trial Committee, Subcommittee on Model Rules for Expanded 
Media Coverage. 
10. 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
11. During the pretrial hearing to consider whether the trial would be televised: 
[A]t least 12 cameramen were engaged in the courtroom throughout the hearing.taking 
motion and still pictures and televising the proceedings. cables and wires were snaked 
across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's bench and others were 
beamed at the jury box and the counsel table. It is conceded that the activities of the televi-
sion crews and news photographers led to considerable disruption of the hearings. 
381 U.S. at 536. 
12. Justice Harlan concurred only in the result. He refused to find that cameras in the court-
room inherently violated the defendant's due process rights. 381 U.S. at 590 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) ("The probable impact of courtroom television on the fairness of a trial may vary according 
to the particular kind of case involved."). 
13. The Court placed great emphasis on the fact that given the state of technology that ex-
isted at the time, television was inherently disruptive of the trial process. 381 U.S. at 544 ("Tele-
vision in its present state and by its very nature, reaches into a variety of areas in which it may 
cause prejudice to an accused."), 551-52 ("It is said that the ever-advancing techniques of public 
communication and the adjustment of the public to its presence may bring about a change in the 
effect of telecasting upon the fairness of criminal trials. But we are not dealing here with future 
developments in the field of electronics."). 
14. The majority opinion acknowledged that "in most cases involving claims of due process 
deprivations .•. [the Court requires] a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused." 381 U.S. 
at 542. In Estes, proof of actual prejudice was lacking. Nevertheless, the Court observed that "at 
times a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result 
that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process." 381 U.S. at 542-43. The broadcasting of 
criminal trials, the Court held, was just such a procedure. 381 U.S. at 544. 
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trials were in use. In Chandler v. Florida, 15 the Supreme Court af-
firmed a burglary conviction despite the fact that the trial was tele-
vised. In so doing, the Court stated that it was not overruling Estes. 16 
Instead, the Court relied on Justice Harlan's concurrence in Estes, 
which it interpreted to hold that cameras in the courtroom violated 
due process only if the trial was in fact compromised by the television 
coverage.17 In Estes, the Chandler Court observed, the fairness of the 
trial had been compromised by the television coverage.18 By contrast, 
the defendant in Chandler was unable to demonstrate that the pres-
ence of cameras in the courtroom had actually interfered with his right 
to receive a fair trial. t9 
In upholding the conviction of Chandler, the Supreme Court 
adopted a states' rights position concerning the broadcasting of state 
criminal trials. 20 While it refused to hold that television coverage is 
constitutionally prohibited,21 the Court also refused to hold that tele-
vision coverage is constitutionally mandated.22 The Court, declining 
to "endorse or to invalidate" Florida's guidelines,23 merely ruled that 
states should be free to experiment and develop their own court rules 
in this area.24 In taking this position, the Court referred the entire 
issue to the states, thus depriving them of guidance as to when the 
Court would consider the psychological and physical disturbances 
caused by broadcasters in the courtroom a due process violation.25 
15. 449 U.S. 560 (1981). 
16. 449 U.S. at 573 (''Estes is not to be read as announcing a constitutional rule barring still 
photographic, radio, and television coverage in all cases and under all circumstances."). 
17. 449 U.S. at 581-82; see also note 12 supra. 
18. 449 U.S. at 582; see note 11 supra. 
19. 449 U.S. at 577-82. 
20. See 449 U.S. at 578 ("Examination and reexamination, by state courts, of the in-court 
presence of the electronic news media, vel non, is an exercise of authority reserved to the states 
under our federalism.") (quoting Brief for Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae at 2). 
For a discussion of the Chaniiler decision and its reliance on federalism principles, see Com-
ment, From Estes to Chandler: Shifting the Constitutional Burden of Courtroom Cameras to tlze 
States, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 315 (1981). According to the author, the Court in Clzandler 
acknowledges the right of the accused to a fair trial but "assigns considerably more importance 
to the states' right to experiment than it does to the fair trial right of the accused." Id. at 328 
(citation omitted). The author explains the victory for states' rights embodied in Clzandler as 
consistent with "the pattern established by the Burger Court of de-federalizing criminal proce-
dure as a step toward correcting 'a dangerous imbalance' which accords too much constitutional 
protection to criminals and too little to their victims and to society at large." Id. at 335 (citing 
Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief Justice of the United States, 
67 A.B.A. J. 290, 291 (1981)). 
21. 449 U.S. at 570-74. 
22. The Court did not grant the broadcast media a first amendment right of access to the 
courtroom. 449 U.S. at 569-70. The case law remains faithful to this aspect of Clzandler; broad-
casters lack a constitutional right of access to criminal trials. See notes 25-40 infra and accompa-
nying text. 
23. 449 U.S. at 582. 
24. 449 U.S. at 582-83. 
25. See Comment, supra note 20, at 333. In discussing Chandler, the author states that "[n)o 
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However, an examination of other Supreme Court decisions, not in-
volving televised trials, sheds light on the proper weight that should be 
afforded the conflicting constitutional interests implicated in the cam-
eras in the courtroom debate. 
One of the constitutional provisions at issue in the cameras in the 
courtroom controversy is, of course, the first amendment. In short, the 
relevant question is whether the first amendment guarantees broad-
casters the "right" to inform the public through the televising of crimi-
nal trials. As the case law now stands, the answer to this question is 
clearly no. In light of Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 26 this answer 
may seem somewhat surprising. In Richmond Newspapers, the Court 
held that the first amendment provides the public and the print media 
a right of access to state criminal trials.27 Noting that the first amend-
ment was adopted against a backdrop of open public trials, the Court 
enunciated in broad terms the benefits of admitting the public and the 
print media - an open trial is more likely to be conducted fairly, par-
ticipants are more inclined to honesty, and community outrage and 
concern tends to be channeled away from "vengeful self-help."28 
The Supreme Court has failed to articulate reasons for treating the 
electronic media differently from the print media in the courtroom 
context. However, the Court has repeatedly noted distinctions be-
tween the media that have persuaded it to uphold regulation of the 
broadcast media and strike down as unconstitutional similar regula-
tion of the print media.29 While the Court's decisions in this area are 
new guidelines for resolving the constitutional stand-off between the free press guarantee of the 
first amendment and the fair trial guarantee of the sixth amendment are offered." Id.; see also 
Note, An Assessment of the Use of Cameras in State and Federal Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 389, 400 
(1984) ("Critical weaknesses in the Chandler decision have prevented the formulation of broad 
constitutional guidelines for the determination of when due process is threatened by the presence 
of cameras in a criminal trial."}. 
26. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
27. Chief Justice Burger, in a plurality opinion joined by Justices White and Stevens, and 
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, concluded that the constitutional right of access to 
criminal trials applies to both the public and the press. 448 U.S. at 576-77, 599. Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall, concurring in the judgment, described the right of access granted by the first 
amendment as belonging to the public. 448 U.S. at 585. The Court discussed Richmond Newspa-
pers in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982): 
Our recent decision in Richmond Newspapers firmly established for the first time that the 
press and general public have a constitutional right of access to criminal trials. Although 
there was no opinion of the Court in that case, seven Justices recognized that this right of 
access is embodied in the First Amendment and applied to the States through the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
457 U.S. at 603 (citation omitted}; cf. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Morphonios, 467 So. 2d 1026, 
1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("[T]here is no first amendment protection of the rights of the 
public and the press to attend pretrial hearings, as distinguished from the right to attend a crimi-
nal trial.") (citation omitted). 
28. 448 U.S. at 571 (citation omitted}. 
29. See notes 67-70 & 178-84 infra and accompanying text; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 
726, 748 (1978) ("[O]f all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most 
limited First Amendment protections."). Compare Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding a statutory right of access to television time for political candi-
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noteworthy in illustrating an historical reluctance to confer first 
amendment protections upon television, none of these distinctions par-
ticularly relates to courtroom access. 
While its rationale for treating the broadcast and print media dif-
ferently in the courtroom context is unclear, the Court in Chandler left 
little doubt that it is unprepared to recognize a first amendment right 
of access for broadcasters. In Chandler, the Court was faced with a 
Florida Supreme Court holding that "pointedly rejected" the assertion 
that there exists a "federal constitutional right of access on the part of 
photographers or the broadcast media to televise or electronically re-
cord and thereafter disseminate court proceedings."30 This holding 
provided the Court with a clear opportunity to extend its decision in 
Richmond Newspapers to the broadcast media. Yet, the Court neatly 
avoided the issue by deciding that the television coverage in Chandler, 
whether mandated by the constitution or not, did not violate the de-
fendant's right to due process.31 The Court's reluctance to embrace 
the opportunity to extend Richmond Newspapers, coupled with its tol-
erance of the ban on television in the federal system, is strong evidence 
that the Court is unwilling to posit a constitutional right of access on 
the part of broadcasters. 32 
While the Supreme Court has been avoiding a definitive decision 
on the first amendment issue, the lower federal courts have been con-
sistently holding that the first amendment does not guarantee the elec-
tronic media a right to televise trials33 or the public a right to view 
dates), and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the fairness 
doctrine as applied to broadcasters by the FCC), and National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 
319 U.S. 190 (1943) (approving the system of broadcast regulation initiated by the Communica· 
tions Act), with Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (holding that 
the fairness doctrine is unconstitutional as applied to the print media). 
30. 449 U.S. at 569 (1981). 
31. 449 U.S. at 569-70, 582. 
32. But cf Ares, Chandler v. Florida: Television, Criminal Trials, and Due Process, 1981 
SuP. Cr. REV. 157, 175-78, which argues that the Court in Chandler was not faced with the 
question of whether television has a first amendment right of access, and that when it is forced to 
address the issue, it should extend Richmond to include a right of access for the broadcast media. 
"[T]here do not seem to be any grounds on which television can be denied the same right of 
access that Richmond Newspapers upholds for the public and the press." Id. at 177. 
33. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) ("[T]here is no 
constitutional right to have [live witness] testimony recorded and broadcast") (citing Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-42 (1965)); United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1985) (dic-
tum); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); 
Combined Communications Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982). But see State ex 
rel. Cosmos Broadcasting v. Brown, 14 Ohio App. 3d 376, 382-83, 471 N.E.2d 874, 883 (1984). 
See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R. 4TH 121, §§ 2a & 3 (1982). Cosmos Broadcasting implies that a 
limited first amendment right of television access does exist: 
[U]nder the First Amendment, the concept of equal access to courtroom proceedings and 
the effective reporting of courtroom events means at least this: unless there is an overriding 
consideration to the contrary, clearly articulated in the trial court's findings, representatives 
of the electronic news media must be allowed to bring their technology with them into the 
courtroom, even if only to a small degree (e.g., a single camera .•• ). 
14 Ohio App. 3d at 382-83, 471 N.E.2d at 883. 
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trials on television. 34 Courts have also upheld the denial of camera 
access to courtrooms as a legitimate time, place, and manner restric-
tion. 35 They contend that the prohibition of cameras does not fore-
close the public's right to learn about trials through other media 
sources or personal attendance and reject the argument that such a 
restriction unfairly discriminates between newspapers and television. 36 
The federal courts' reluctance to find a first amendment right of 
access for broadcasters in the context of state criminal trials may well 
be explained by the necessary consequences of such a holding on the 
34. Recently, the Second Circuit stated: 
There is a long leap ... between a public right under the First Amendment to attend trials 
and a public right under the First Amendment to see a given trial televised. It is a leap that 
is not supported by history. It is a leap that we are not yet prepared to take. 
Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. 
Ct. 3478 (1985). 
35. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 578, 581 n.18; 448 U.S. at 600 (Stewart, J., con-
curring) ("Just as a legislature may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon 
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, so may a trial judge impose reasonable limitations 
upon the unrestricted occupation of a courtroom by representatives of the press and members of 
the public."). Cases applying this reasoning to justify the exclusion of cameras from the court-
room include Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1984) 
(Winter, J., concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3478 (1985); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 
1278, 1282 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983). The Court recently explained the 
general nature of the time, place, and manner limitation in United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 
(1983): 
[T]he government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the 
restrictions "are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Additional restric-
tions such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if 
narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. 
461 U.S. at 177 (citations omitted); see also Kelso & Pawluc, Focus on Cameras in the Court-
room: The Florida Experience, The California Experiment, and the Pending Decision in Chandler 
v. Florida, 12 PAC. L.J. 1, 23 (1980) ("Allowing reporters into a trial but prohibiting television 
cameras may fall within the plausible scope of a permissible regulation on the manner of ac-
cess."). But see Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes Revisited, or a Modest Proposal 
for the Constitutional Protection of the News-Gathering Process, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641, 667-68. 
Zimmerman argues that 
bans on cameras and recording equipment are not merely time, place, and manner restric-
tions. Time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible because they do not regulate the 
content of the message; rather they restrict the manner in which it is expressed .... 
. . . Because the content conveyed by photographs or the electronic media cannot be 
duplicated in written or oral descriptions, the restraint on access directly restricts speech 
itself. · 
Id. 
36. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965) (both television and radio journalists 
have the same access rights - those of the general public); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 
1278, 1283 (1983) ("We can foresee no additional measure of confidence which might emanate 
merely from the different manner of media access, e.g., excerpts oflive witnesses on the television 
screen, as opposed to an artist's sketch.") (citing United States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 
497 F.2d 102, 106 (5th Cir. 1974)); cf. KPNX Broadcasting v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 
252, 678 P.2d 431, 437 (1984) (petitioners argue that a court order limiting the broadcasting of 
sketches violates the equal protection clause by restraining only broadcasters and not the print 
media; the court finds the sketch order to be an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech pro-
tected by the first amendment and does not reach the equal protection ground). But see Ares, 
supra note 32, at 157, 177 (arguing that television can not constitutionally receive treatment 
different from the print media, and that cameras should have access to courtrooms). 
482 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:475 
conduct of federal trials. Surely, if the first amendment guarantees 
access to state criminal trials, it likewise guarantees access to federal 
criminal trials. Such a result, however, would upset a fairly rigid set of 
rules prohibiting or limiting the televising of federal trials. Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 53 bans television from all federal crimi-
nal trials. 37 This rule has been upheld and television access denied 
even when a defendant has requested that his trial be televised. 38 In 
addition, Judicial Canon 3A(7), which governs courtroom photogra-
phy and televising in all cases not covered by rule 53, provides for 
televised trials only under a very limited set of circumstances. 39 In 
37. "The taking of photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial proceedings 
or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the court room shall not be permitted by the 
court." l'°ED. R. CRIM. P. 53. 
38. See United ·states v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 
(1983). The court in Hastings. ruled that the first amendment right of access to criminal trials 
upheld by the Supreme Court'. in Richmond Newspapers did not include a right to cover trials 
with audio and video equipment and that the prohjbitions on visual and aural coverage of federal 
court proceedings did not viol11te the first amendment. The court upheld FED. R. CRIM. P. 53, 
which bans cameras from federal courts. See also Unit<;d States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 
1985) (court denied defendant'.s motion to videotape in-court proceedings); Combined Communi-
cations Corp. v. Finesilver, 672 F.2d 818 (10th Cir. 1982) (denying petition for writ of manda-
mus to require federal judge to permit televising of in-court negotiation). 
39. The House of Delegates of the ABA adopted canon 35 on September 30, 1937 in response 
to the disruption and sensationalism caused by the media over the trial of Bruno Hauptmann, 
who was convicted of kidnappjµg and murdering the Lindbergh baby, see State v. Hauptmann, 
115 N.J.L. 41,2, 180 A. 809, cip-t. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935). Canon 35 originally read: 
Proceedings in court should be conducted with. fitting dignity and decorum. The taking of 
photographs in the cou11room, during sessions of the court or recesses between sessions, and 
the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the essential dignity of 
the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconceptions with respect thereto in the 
mind of the public and should not be permitted. 
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS- Canon 35 (1937), published in 62 A.B.A. REP. 1134-35 (1937) 
(repealed and replaced in 1979). See Note, supra note 25, for a good .discussion of the historical 
development of canon 35. 
In 1952, the canon was amended to prohibit television as well. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 
532, 598 app. (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
The ABA amended canon 35 by inserting a phrase banning the use of television cameras 
during court proceedings and by adding a phrase stating that broadcasting distracts the 
witness in giving his testimon.Y. A third sentence was also added that provided for the 
televising and broadcasting of certain ceremonial proceedings. 
Note, supra note 25, at 390 n.6. 
"At the ABA's 1979 mid-year meeting, the House of Delegates voted solidly against a propo-
sal [of its Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice] to allow court-
room photography and radio broadcasting." Id. at 391 n.8; see House Pulls the Plug on Cameras 
in Court, 65 A.B.A. J. 333 (1979). The ABA's 1979 action reaffirmed the 1972 replacement of 
canon 35 with canon 3A(7) of the A.B.A. Code of Judicial Conduct, which stood until August 
1982. As adopted, canon 3A(7) read: 
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the 
courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses be-
tween sessions, except that a judge may authorize: (a) the use of electronic or photographic 
means for the presentation of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other pur-
poses of judicial administration; (b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photograph-
ing of investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings; (c) the photographic or 
electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate court proceedings under the following 
conditions: (i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the dignity of 
the proceedings; (ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or re-
corded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and reproduction; 
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1984, the Judicial Conference rejected a petition from twenty-eight ra-
dio, television, newspaper, and related media organizations proposing 
to amend canon 3A(7) and rule 53 to facilitate media access to court-
room proceedings.40 Given this reluctance to allow television access 
to federal courts, it is doubtful that the Supreme Court41 would hold 
that broadcasters have a first amendment right of access to judicial 
proceedings. 
In arguing for the right to photograph and televise criminal trials, 
broadcasters have not relied solely on the first amendment. In addi-
tion, they have pointed to the sixth amendment's grant of a "public 
trial"42 as an independent justification for permitting television cover-
age of courtroom proceedings. This argument has been rejected, how-
ever, on the ground that the sixth amendment right to a public trial 
belongs to the accused rather than the public.43 In Nixon v. Warner 
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has been concluded and 
all direct appeals have been exhausted; and (iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for 
instructional purposes in educational institutions. · 
Commentary: Temperate conduct of judicial proceedings is essential to the fair adminis-
tration of justice. The recording and reproduction of a proceeding should not distort or 
dramatize the proceeding. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (1972), reprinted in RTNDA, supra note 3, at A-1 to 
A-2. 
The 1982 revision of canon 3A(7) reads as follows: 
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording or photographing in courtrooms 
and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court, or recesses between ses-
sions, except that under rules prescribed by a supervising appellate court or other appropri-
ate authority, a judge may authorize broadcasting, televising, recording and photographing 
of judicial proceedings in courtrooms and areas immediately adjacent thereto consistent 
with the right of the parties to a fair trial and subject to express conditions, limitations, and 
guidelines which allow such coverage in a manner that will be unobtrusive, will not distract 
the trial participants, and will not otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7) (1984). 
40. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE Ao Hoc COMMITTEE ON CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM, 
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1984) (recommending that the Conference reject the 
petititon) [hereinafter cited as JUD. CONF. REP.]. 
41. At least one member of the current Court, Chief Justice Burger, has spoken out strongly 
against permitting cameras in the courtroom. See A Closed Mind, NATL. L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 
12. 
42. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ...• " U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
43. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-81 (1979) ("Our cases have uniformly 
recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant."); Nixon v. 
Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978) ("[T]he guarantee of a public trial •.. confers 
no special benefit on the press."); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concur-. 
ring) ("[T]he right of 'public trial' is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging to the 
accused, and inhering in the institutional process by which justice is administered."); United 
States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 
1284 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 931 (1983); Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659, 660 (9th 
Cir. 1959); Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (D.C. Pa. 1957), ajfd., 254 
F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); Fla. Report, supra note 3, at 774; see also Douglas, The Public Trial and 
the Free Press, 33 RocKY MTN. L. REv. l, 5 (1960) ("The public trial exists because of the 
aversion which liberty-loving people have toward secret trials and proceedings. That is the rea-
son our courts are open to the public, not because the framers wanted to provide the public with 
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Communications, the Supreme Court did suggest that the guarantee of 
a public trial assures the public and press the "opportunity" to attend 
a trial and report on what they observe.44 The Court made clear, how-
ever, that this limited access to the courtroom was designed to ensure 
that the accused was not tried and persecuted in secret.4s The "oppor-
tunity" of the public and the press to attend the trial was considered 
enough to avert this danger; beyond this, the sixth amendment did not 
require "that [a] trial - or any part of it - be broadcast live or on 
tape to the public."46 
The sixth amendment's grant of a "public trial," then, is primarily 
a guarantee that a criminal defendant will be "fairly dealt with and not 
unjustly condemned."47 In this respect, the amendment is largely du-
plicative of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment;48 
both provisions operate to protect the accused against unfair trial pro-
cedures. 49 Indeed, in Estes v. Texas, the Court spoke almost inter-
changeably of the two provisions in reaching its conclusion that the 
televising of Estes' criminal trial was constitutionally impermissible.so 
To summarize, the Supreme Court's decisions in the cameras in 
the courtroom area establish the following constitutional principles. 
First, broadcasters do not possess a first amendment or sixth amend-
ment right to televise criminal trials.st Second, states may permit 
recreation or with instruction in the ways of government.") (footnote omitted); Note, supra note 
25, at 397. But see Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1007 § 3 (1973). 
44. 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978). 
45. 435 U.S. at 610. 
46. 435 U.S. at 610. 
47. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965). 
48. For a good example of a due process violation attributable to improper media activity, 
see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). In Maxwell, the "carnival" atmosphere created 
by the media made it impossible for the defendant to receive a fair trial: 
The fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial and newsmen took over 
practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants in the trial, especially 
Sheppard. At a temporary table within a few feet of the jury box and counsel table sat some 
20 reporters staring at Sheppard and taking notes. The erection of a press table for reporters 
inside the bar is unprecedented. The bar of the court is reserved for counsel, providing them 
a safe place in which to keep papers and exhibits, and to confer privately with a client and 
co-counsel. It was designed to protect the witness and the jury from any distractions, intru-
sions or influences, and to permit bench discussions of the judge's rulings away from the 
hearing of the public and the jury. Having assigned almost all of the available seats in the 
courtroom to the news media, the judge lost his ability to supervise that environment. The 
movement of the reporters in and out of the courtroom caused frequent confusion and dis-
ruption of the trial. And the record reveals constant commotion within the bar. Moreover, 
the judge gave the throng of newsmen gathered in the corridors of the courthouse absolute 
free rein. Participants in the trial, including the jury, were forced to run a gauntlet of re-
porters and photographers each time they entered or left the courtroom. 
384 U.S. at 355. A similar "circus" atmosphere prevailed in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). 
See note 11 supra. 
49. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539-40 (1965) (both the due process clause and the sixth 
amendment "require a procedure that will assure a fair trial"). 
50. 381 U.S. at 538-44. 
51. See notes 26-46 supra and accompanying text. 
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cameras in their courtrooms only if they take steps to protect the de-
fendant's due process and sixth amendment rights to a fair trial. 52 It is 
only within the parameters of these constitutional principles that 
states are free to fashion guidelines governing the use of cameras in 
their courtrooms. The Court's assignment of greater weight to the de-
fendant's interests than those of the media must serve as a backdrop 
for all decisions regarding particular guideline provisions. While there 
may be first amendment values served by television coverage, state 
guidelines must ensure that a defendant's constitutional rights are 
never threatened in an effort to serve them. 
II. CONFLICTING INTERESTS 
Part I described the constitutional parameters within which the 
states must operate in regulating television access to criminal trials. 
Within these parameters, however, the states have considerable discre-
tion to regulate the manner in which cameras are (or are not) utilized 
in their courtrooms. The following section seeks to identify those pol-
icy interests that the states should consider in promulgating guidelines 
for the use of cameras in their criminal justice systems. 
A. Reasons to Limit Televised Trials 
1. Assuring an Untainted Trial 
The physical and psychological disturbances associated with tele-
vising a trial have been held to be so bothersome as to violate the 
defendant's sixth amendment and due process rights. 53 However, tele-
vising in compliance with Florida's guidelines, which impose minimal 
restraints on broadcasters, 54 was upheld in Chandler v. Florida as not 
violative of due process. 55 Thus, it is likely that televising under other 
state guidelines, more protective of the defendant, would also be held 
constitutional. But even when the psychological and physical distrac-
tions caused by cameras do not amount to a constitutional violation, 
they are still undesirable and should be minimized as a matter of 
policy. 
Television equipment and accompanying activity can physically 
distract trial participants. The Supreme Court in Estes stated that dis-
turbances caused by cumbersome equipment, cables, lighting, and 
52. See notes 10-25 & 47-50 supra and accompanying text. 
53. See notes 10-14 & 47-50 supra and accompanying text. 
54. Florida's guidelines, which were adopted in Fla. Report, supra note 3, are in many re-
spects less restrictive than those of other states. For example, guidelines in Alabama, Alaska, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Tennessee require the defendant's consent as a 
precondition to televising. RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-10. In addition, 18 states prohibit cover-
age of certain types of sensitive proceedings. Id. at B-19 to B-25. Florida's guidelines contain 
neither of these restrictions. 
55. See notes 15-25 supra and accompanying text. 
486 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:475 
camera technicians prejudiced the trial. 56 The Court in Chandler ar-
gued that advanced technology has greatly reduced these distrac-
tions. 57 While technology has certainly streamlined televising, as long 
as a camera is in the courtroom, some disruption is likely to remain.58 
The psychological distractions that accompany broadcasting are 
not as easily measurable or preventable and are potentially more dam-
aging. 59 The knowledge that the trial is being televised, it is argued, 
may diminish the jury's attentiveness, 60 frighten timid witnesses, 61 and 
cause judges and lawyers to behave differently than they ordinarily 
would.62 As Chief Justice Warren stated in his concurrence in Estes, 
the psychological effects of broadcasting, though subtle, can seriously 
threaten the administration of a fair trial. 63 
56. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536-38 (1965). 
57. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 576 (1981) ("[M]any of the negative factors found in 
Estes - cumbersome equipment, cables, distracting lighting, numerous camera technicians -
are less substantial factors today than they were at that time."); cf. Note, Televised Trials: Co11-
stitutional Constraints, Practical Implications, and State Experimentation, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
910, 925 (1978) ("Modem television cameras can be operated noiselessly, without the need for 
additional lighting, and no longer pose a source of distraction to those present.") (citation 
omitted). 
58. Guidelines can serve to minimize these disturbances. Examples of state restrictions to 
minimize physical distractions include the following: "Only equipment-that does not produce 
distracting sound or light shall be employed to cover judicial proceedings .... No motorized 
drives shall be permitted, and no moving lights, flash attachments, or sudden lighting changes 
shall be permitted during court proceedings." CAL. Ctv. & CRIM. Cr. R. CODE, Ruic 
980.2(h)(2)(i) (West 1981). 
Reports from states that impose guidelines designed to limit noise have found such rules to be 
successful in reducing physical disruptions. See, e.g., ERNEST H. SHORT AND ASSOCIATES, INC., 
EVALUATION OF CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIMENT WITH EXTENDED MEDIA COVERAGE OP 
COURTS 228-29 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CAL. REPORT]; Fla. Report, supra note 3, at 768; 
Hawaii Report, supra note 1; G. HUMPHRIES, LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT REPORT ON PILOT 
PROJECT ON THE PRESENCE OF CAMERAS AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IN THE COURTROOM 
2, 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LA. REPORT]. 
59. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 577 (1981) ("Inherent in electronic coverage of a 
trial is the risk that the very awareness by the accused of the coverage and the contemplated 
broadcast may adversely affect the conduct of the participants and the fairness of the trial, yet 
leave no evidence of how the conduct or the trial's fairness was affected."); Estes v. Texas, 381 
U.S. 532, 545-50 (1965) (discussing impact on jurors, witnesses, judges, and defendants); Calla-
han v. Lash, 381 F. Supp. 827, 833 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (citing Estes with approval); State v. Green, 
395 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1981) (requiring evidentiary hearing into psychological effects of media 
coverage on defendants). 
60. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 546 (1965). 
61. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547 (1965); Gaines and Stuplinski, supra note 6, at 299 
("There is a vast difference between the anticipation there may be spectators in the courtroom 
and having an individual's picture and actions appearing on the television screen, locally or na-
tionally."); Note, Cameras in the Criminal Courtroom: A Sixth Amendment Analysis, 85 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 1546 (1985) (discussing how the intimidation of witnesses can deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial); JUD. CONF. REP., supra note 40, at 5. 
62. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548 (1965); see also 381 U.S. at 579 (Warren, C.J., 
concurring). 
63. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 565, 578-80 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring). For an 
example of another celebrated case in which psychological distractions were held to contribute to 
a denial of due process, see the discussion of Sheppard v. Maxwell at note 48 supra. 
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The Chandler Court correctly acknowledged that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence concerning the psychological effects that cameras 
have on defendants, witnesses, and jurors. 64 Lacking sufficient evi-
dence that cameras inherently burden the judicial process, the Court 
refused to interfere with state experimentation in this area. 65 An 
equally plausible and more cautious response would have been to curb 
or even deny camera access until sufficient data could be accumulated 
as to its effects. The Court supported its decision by noting that none 
of the state experiments were able to show that electronic coverage 
consistently created psychological distractions. 66 The surveys done in 
those reports, however, consisted in part of asking jurors after trial 
whether they felt that the presence of cameras distracted them and 
prevented them from making a fair decision. 67 It is unlikely that jurors 
after a trial would concede that they were unable, for any reason, to 
reach a fair, rational decision in the case. 
The psychological effects on witnesses of courtroom distractions 
· have been considered a serious enough threat to the fair administra-
tion of justice to justify excluding spectators from the courtroom dur-
ing the testimony of particular witnesses. 68 Courts have excluded the 
public in order to safeguard a witness against possible reprisal69 or 
prevent embarrassment and emotional disturbance to the witness. 70 
64. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 576-80 (1981). Both proponents and opponents of 
cameras in the courtroom acknowledge the deficiency in empirical evidence to support their 
positions. See, e.g., MINN. REPORT, supra note 6, at 16 ("[T]here is almost no solid empirical 
evidence to support either position."). 
65. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text. 
66. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 576 n.11, 578-79 (1981). 
67. See, e.g., Fla. Report, supra note 3; Hawaii Report, supra note 1; THE ADVISORY CoM-
MITIEE TO OVERSEE THE EXPERIMENTAL USE OF CAMERAS AND RECORDING EQUIPMENT IN 
COURTROOMS, 1982 REPORT TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT [hereinafter cited as MASS. 
REPORT); REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT COMMITIEE TO MONITOR AND EVALUATE THE 
USE OF AUDIO AND VISUAL EQUIPMENT IN THE COURTROOM (1979) [hereinafter cited as WIS. 
REPORT). 
68. See Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956); State v. 
Palm Beach Newspapers, 395 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1981) (excluding electronic media because of fear 
of reprisals against witnesses); People v. Hagan, 24 N.Y.2d 395, 248 N.E.2d 588, 300 N.Y.S.2d 
835, cerL denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969); see also note 75 infra; Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 852 (1971) 
(exclusion of public in sex offense cases); Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1436 (1956) (exclusion of public 
during criminal trial). 
69. See, e.g., People v. Hagan, 24 N.Y.2d 395, 248 N.E.2d 588, 300 N.Y.S.2d 835 (spectators 
excluded due to witness' fear of reprisal for testifying against alleged murderers of Malcolm X), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969); see also United States ex rel. Smallwood v. LaValle, 377 F. 
Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (spectators excluded partly to protect welfare of pregnant witness 
and her unborn child, and partly due to subjective fears of reprisal), affd. without published 
opinion, 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 920 (1975). 
70. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 599 P.2d 199 (1979) (excluding spectators during 
a rape victim's testimony); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980) (spectators excluded while 
witness testified to details of a sexual assault); see also note 75 infra (citing additional cases). But 
see People v. Smith, 90 Mich. App. 20, 282 N.W.2d 277 (1979) (dictum hypothesizing that in a 
trial for criminal sexual conduct, defendant could not prevent media from attending proceedings 
had media objected to exclusion). 
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These orders have been upheld as valid discretionary decisions made 
in part to ensure that the courtroom atmosphere does not inhibit a 
witness from fully disclosing his or her information. If such concerns 
at times support excluding the public and the print media from the 
courtroom, they certainly justify restricting or even excluding the tele-
vision medium, where the risk that negative psychological reactions 
may inhibit complete and honest testimony is even greater.71 
2. Protecting Privacy 
A second justification for limiting the televising of criminal trials is 
the privacy interests of the defendant. To be sure, the defendant has 
no absolute "right" of privacy in the events that transpire in a court-
room. As the Supreme Court held in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn, 72 a judicial proceeding is a public event, and information on the 
public record may be broadcast despite its highly sensitive nature. 73 
71. See notes 78-82 infra and accompanying text. 
72. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
73. 420 U.S. at 492-97. In Cox, broadcasters publicized a rape victim's name in violation of a 
Georgia statute forbidding such publication. The father of the deceased victim sued Cox Broad-
casting for money damages alleging an invasion of privacy. 420 U.S. at 471-75. The Court re-
versed the Georgia Supreme Court's decision on behalf of the father, concluding that "interests 
in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public record." 420 U.S. 
at 494-95. See also Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310 (1977) (per 
curiam) (a state may not sanction the press for accurately reporting widely disseminated infor-
mation obtained at court proceedings open to the public); Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 374 
(1947) ("A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public property •••• 
Those who see and hear what transpired can report it with impunity."); Fla. Report, supra note 
3, at 779 (no right of privacy in a judicial proceeding, which is a public event); State ex rel. New 
Mexico Press Assn. v. Kaufman, 98 N.M. 261, 266-67, 648 P.2d 300, 305-06 (1982) (trial court 
erred in restricting publication of names of jurors where names were announced in open court 
and filed as part of public record); Ayers v. Lee Enterprises, 277 Or. 527, 536-37, 561 P.2d 998, 
1002-03 (1977) (no cause of action for publication of rape victim's name, if the name is part of 
the public record); State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 378, 679 P.2d 353, 361 (1984) (the press has 
an absolute right accurately to publish and broadcast lawfully obtained information that is a 
matter of public record); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comment b (1977) 
("There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the 
plaintiff that is already public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about the 
plaintiff's life that are matters of public record .... "). But see Comment, First Amendment 
Limitations on Public Disclosure Actions, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 180, 189-90 (1977). 
One student commentator has expressed a contrary view, arguing that judicial proceedings 
are not in fact public events: 
Buttressing the result dictated by its first two grounds of decision, the Court [in Cox] 
argued that, as recognized by the common law public records defense to a privacy action, 
there is no substantial privacy interest in information already on the public record. 
Although the Court was less than explicit, the argument seems to be that because no legiti-
mate privacy interests are infringed by giving publicity to public information, it is unconsti-
tutional to impose sanctions on the press for printing such information, regardless of its 
importance. 
This argument rests on a false premise. Although it is true that a public disclosure 
action lies only if the facts disclosed are not widely known, it is disingenuous to suggest that 
all facts on the public record are public facts, in the sense that they are known to a substan-
tial number of people. Giving publicity to little-known facts in the public record may appre-
ciably affect individual privacy. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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However, in Cox the Court acknowledged that there may be privacy 
interests in need of protection in the courtroom. It went on to observe 
that a valid way to protect such interests is to avoid public documenta-
tion or other exposure of private information. 74 Many state and federal 
courts have done just that, closing entire trials (or portions thereof) to 
the public and press to protect witnesses from unnecessary pressures 
or embarrassment and to maintain order in the courtroom. 75 Several 
states acknowledge the privacy interest as a real concern in the cam-
74. 420 U.S. at 496 ("If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the 
States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private 
information. Their political institutions must weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of 
the public to know and of the press to publish.") (footnote omitted); see also Briscoe v. Reader's 
Digest Assn., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d 34, 42, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 874 (1971) ("[T]he rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to privacy."). 
75. See, e.g., United States ex rel Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.) (in an effort to 
preserve the future usefulness and to safeguard the life of an undercover agent, the court ex-
cluded the public from the trial during his testimony), cert denied. 423 U.S. 937 (1975); United 
States ex rel Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965) (public excluded to maintain order in 
courtroom), cert denied, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966); United States ex rel Smallwood v. La Valle, 377 
F. Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y.) (exclusion of public during testimony of teenage expectant mother, 
based partly on concern for welfare of mother and her unborn child and partly on mother's 
subjective fear of reprisal), ajfd. without published opinion, 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1974), cert 
denied, 421 U.S. 920 (1975); United States v. Geise, 158 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Alaska) (exclud-
ing all spectators except family, close friends, and members of the press and bar in a trial for rape 
of a nine-year-old girl in which two witnesses were girls seven and eleven years of age, arguing 
that "a trial judge in the exercise of a sound discretion may exclude members of the public as 
may become reasonably necessary in order to protect a witness from embarrassment by reason of 
having to testify to delicate or revolting facts ... "), ajfd., 262 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1958), cert 
denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 
1957) (to protect defendant's privacy, banning photographs in vicinity of courtroom), ajfd., 254 
F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); Brumfield v. State, 108 So. 2d 33, 38 (Fla. 1958) (Upholding, against 
claims of first amendment freedom of press, a court order prohibiting photography during the 
arraignment of a defendant indicted for rape. Without actually so holding the court indicated 
that the validity of the order would also have been upheld on the ground that it was a legitimate 
measure to protect the right of privacy of the defendant.), 108 So. 2d 33, 37 ("[P]ortions of the 
proceedings assume the aspects of a private event in connection with which attendance and con-
duct could reasonably be restricted or controlled ... . ");Ex Parte Strum, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 
312 (1927) (order excluding photographers is necessary in part to preserve the dignity and deco-
rum of the courtroom and did not infringe upon freedom of the press); Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 
385 Mass. 863, 868, 434 N.E.2d 633, 638 (1982) ("Judges may exclude spectators from the court-
room when necessary to protect witnesses, shelter confidential information, or maintain order.") 
(citation omitted); Mack Appeal, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956) (upholding a court rule 
prohibiting taking photographs in courtrooms in part on the ground that criminal defendants 
have a "right of privacy" which courts have an inherent duty to safeguard), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 
1002 (1957); State v. Sinclair, 275 S.C. 608, 614, 274 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1981) ("The public was 
excluded only while the prosecuting witness testified. . . . The primary reason for the order was 
to shield the witness, a young girl nine years of age, from public scrutiny while she was recount-
ing the details of an embarrassing and sensitive incident."). For a general discussion of the vari-
ous tests used to determine if a trial should be closed to the public, see 2 W. LAFAVE & J. 
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 22.1 (1984). The authors cite Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
rior Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982), in which the Court held unconstitutional on first amendment 
grounds a Massachusetts statute mandating closure of every trial involving sex offenses with 
minors. Although the Court invalidated the Massachusetts statute, it made clear that the first 
amendment does not necessarily bar exclusion from the courtroom of the press and public in 
such cases. Instead, the exclusion decision must be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into 
account the state interest in "the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma 
and embarrassment .... " 457 U.S. at 607. 
490 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:475 
eras in the courtroom debate. Arizona, for example, explicitly recog-
nizes that the trial participants' interest in privacy is an important 
element in the decision whether to allow cameras. 76 The report of the 
District of Columbia Bar on cameras in the courtroom, in recom-
mending that certain highly sensitive trials not be televised, argues 
that in such instances the privacy "rights" of the parties outweigh the 
public's interest in access by the electronic media.77 Courts and com-
mentators have thus accepted that privacy invasion is a compelling 
reason to prohibit the broadcasting of certain evidence. 
Opponents of cameras in the courtroom argue that the privacy in-
terests of trial participants are more easily threatened by the broadcast 
than by the print media, 78 and that exclusion of cameras may there-
fore be legitimate even when exclusion of the press is not. This con-
tention is based on the assumption that the electronic media are 
different from the print media in both their nature and their impact on 
the public. Although the issue is debated, 79 there is strong evidence 
supporting the existence of this difference. For one, the evidence sug-
gests that television is a more pervasive medium than newsprint. Re-
ports show that television is the number one source of news across the 
nation.80 A 1981 study revealed that ninety-eight percent of American 
homes have a television set and the average family watches television 
6.9 hours a day. 81 In contrast, only twenty-three percent of Ameri-
cans buy a morning newspaper and only thirty-one percent purchase 
an evening paper. 82 This suggests that the televising of a trial would 
provide for more widespread public exposure than a newspaper 
description. 
3. Avoiding Burdens on Judicial Management 
The added activities of broadcasting create new problems requiring 
76. See ARIZ. CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(b)(ii) (Sup. Ct. R. 81 1985). 
77. THE COMMITTEE ON CAMERAS IN THE COURTS OF DIVISION IV OF THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA BAR, REPORT 7 (1984) [hereinafter cited as D.C. REPORT]. 
78. See Cotsirilos & Jenner, Cameras in the Courtroom - An Opposing View, ILL. TRIAL 
LAW. J. Fall-Winter 1982, at 24, 59-60 (television coverage magnifies the trauma of crime vie· 
tims); Note, supra note 57, at 918 ("The television camera's unique ubiquitousness dictates a 
reconsideration of conventional notions of privacy when evaluating that medium's impact on a 
judicial proceeding."). 
79. Compare articles cited in note 78 supra (television magnifies the trauma and publicity of a 
trial), with Ares, supra note 32, at 177 (no constitutional difference between television and print 
media), and Bollinger, On the Legal Relationship Between Old and New Tech110/ogies of Commu-
nication, 26 GERMAN Y.B. INTL. L. 269 (1983) (questioning the validity of the justification for 
different regulation of television and the print media). 
80. See Ares, supra note 32, at 174 (citing ROPER ORG., PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF TELEVI· 
SION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA: A TWENTY YEAR REVIEW, 1959-79). 
81. "Television in the Courtroom," supra note 6, at 41 (statement of Herald Price Fahringer, 
General Counsel, First Amendment Trial Lawyers Association). 
82. Id. 
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judges to expend additional time on administration and oversight. 83 
Many state guidelines require the judge to hold a hearing in which 
trial participants may object t9 televising. If the court decides to allow 
cameras, the judge must ensure compliance with the guidelines. Some 
of these administrative burdens are eased by the fact that most state 
guidelines establish a media pool and a liaison to represent all stations 
desiring to televise. However, the media pool does not eliminate many 
of the burdens created by cameras in the courtroom. Significant bur-
dens that remain include increased difficulty in empaneling an impar-
tial jury for retrial, larger jury panels, increased use of marshals, 84 and 
more frequent necessity for sequestering jurors. Jury sequestration 
both burdens judicial management and creates a more hostile jury. 
Unfortunately, jury sequestration is often unavoidable. If not seques-
tered, jurors may be unable to resist the temptation to view themselves 
on television despite the judge's instructions not to do so. 85 
4. The Questionable Educational Benefits of Televising 
Criminal Trials 
It is often asserted that cameras in the courtroom help to educate 
the public on the workings of our criminal justice system. 86 However, 
it is questionable whether televised trials actually serve as a useful edu-
cational tool. According to the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Commit-
tee on Cameras in the Courtroom, media coverage of state court 
proceedings has not resulted in increased public understanding of the 
courts. 87 Rather than educating the public, the manner of televising 
has often resulted in miseducation and a distortion of the trial. In 
Chandler, for example, the television stations broadcast merely two 
minutes and fifty-five seconds of the trial and showed only excerpts 
from the prosecution's direct examination and closing statements. 88 
Such an abbreviated and one-sided presentation leads to more distor-
tion and miseducation than education.89 Moreover, reports show that 
television is regarded as a more believable medium than. newspapers, 
83. Juo. CoNF. REP., supra note 40, at 4. 
84. Id. 
85. See "Television in the Courtroom," supra note 6, at 40 (statement of Herald Price Fahr-
inger, General Counsel, First Amendment Trial Lawyers Association) ("[J]urors will ... find it 
[hard] to obey a judge's admonition to refrain from watching newscasts which may feature 
them."); Juo. CONF. REP., supra note 40, at 5-6; see also MINN. REPORT, supra note 6, at 12, 17 
(general discussion of sequestration). 
86. See Part II. B infra. 
87. Juo. CoNF. REP., supra note 40, at 7. 
88. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 568 (1981). 
89. See also MINN. REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 (finding "no evidence of any meaningful 
educational and informational value to the public from the limited and unbalanced coverage that 
is characteristic of presenting video and audio coverage under current commercial television 
news formats for such coverage"). 
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radio, and magazines.90 This fact makes such one-sided and incom-
plete programming even more dangerous. 
Media self-regulation could conceivably cure this disturbing prob-
lem of distortion. However, the broadcast media, unlike other profes-
sions, do not operate under a sophisticated system of ethical codes.91 
Accordingly, stringent state guidelines are needed to ensure that 
broadcasters present trials in a representative and unbiased manner. 
B. The Interest in Uninhibited Television Access: 
First Amendment Values 
While broadcasters have not been granted a first amendment right 
to televise trials,92 such televising serves many first amendment values. 
The traditional arguments given for public trials93 also support tele-
vised trials. Media access advances public awareness of the judicial 
system and its current proceedings, facilitates judicial oversight, and 
permits community catharsis.94 In addition, the unique nature of the 
television medium offers other benefits beyond those provided simply 
by opening the courtroom to the public and press. 
Televised trials, if broadcast in an undistorted fashion, can educate 
the public about its judicial system, thus satisfying the public's consti-
tutional "right to know." Although in theory each citizen is entitled 
to attend trial proceedings,95 practicalities such as the small size of a 
courtroom and the limited amount of time individuals can devote to 
attending trials mean that, unaided by the media, the public is likely to 
remain relatively ignorant of the activities that transpire in a court-
room. In addition to teaching the public about courtroom procedure, 
televising trials provides information about public issues. The broad-
casting of criminal trials, such as rape and murder cases, increases 
public awareness of many serious problems in society.96 
Televised proceedings also aid in public oversight of the judiciary. 
According to former Justice Potter Stewart, "[t]he primary purpose of 
the constitutional guarantee of a free press was ... to create a fourth 
institution outside Government as an additional check on the three 
90. See Note, supra note 25, at 404 n.96. 
91. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
92. See notes 26-41 supra and accompanying text. 
93. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text. 
94. For a discussion of the traditional justifications for open trials, see Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983). 
95. See notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text. 
96. In a well publicized case, in which six men were charged with raping a woman on a 
barroom pool table in New Bedford, Massachusetts, a cable network televised large portions of 
the trial. Although the head of Women Organized Against Rape complained that the coverage 
might discourage other victims from reporting rapes, she admitted that the publicity could also 
be helpful in focusing public attention on the problem of sexual assaults and the rights of victims. 
Friendly, CNN Plans to Cover Sex Abuse Trial, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1984, at C22, col. 3. 
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official branches."97 This judicial oversight role was recognized as 
well in Sheppard v. Maxwell, where the Court observed that "[t]he 
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards 
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, 
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."98 
A third benefit gained from televised trials has been described as a 
"community therapeutic value."99 Criminal acts often provoke public 
outrage and the urge to retaliate. I00 Opening the criminal justice sys-
tem to the public through television provides an outlet for such com-
munity hostility.IOI In addition, this hostility may be abated somewhat 
when the public is shown that justice is being done. Televising trials 
may thus serve a prophylactic purpose and reduce the probability that 
the public will take the law into its own hands. Io2 
Lastly, the unique nature of the electronic media enables them to 
serve these functions in ways the print media cannot. The print media 
are unable to convey as accurately as television the witnesses' de-
meanor and the overall atmosphere of the courtroom. I03 In addition, 
the pervasiveness of television I04 makes it a superior device to dissemi-
nate information about a trial. 
97. Address by Justice Stewart, Yale Law School (Nov. 2, 1974), reprinted in, Stewart, "Or 
of the Press," 26 HAsTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). But see Lewis, A Preferred Position for Journal-
ism?, 7 HoFSrRA L. RE.v. 595 (1979) (arguing that the freedom of the "press" is not limited to 
the news media, but is a right for those outside the professional press as well). 
98. 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966), quoted in Marcus, The Media in the Courtroom: Attending, 
Reporting, Televising Criminal Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 235, 237 (1982); see also "Television in the 
Courtroom," supra note 6, at 40 ("The criminal justice system must be held to a high degree of 
accountability which can only be obtained by a vigorous and independent press."). 
99. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) (quoting Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570 (1980)). 
100. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1984) ("Criminal 
acts, especially violent crimes, often provoke public concern, even outrage and hostility; this in 
turn generates a community urge to retaliate and desire to have justice done."); Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) ("When a shocking crime occurs, a community 
reaction of outrage and public protest often follows."); T. REIK, Foregiveness and Vengeance, in 
THE COMPULSION TO CoNFESS 408 (1959) (stating that human beings have a "truly unquench-
able need for vengeance"). 
101. See Pres~-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984) ("when the public 
is aware that the law is being enforced and the criminal justice system is functioning, an outlet is 
provided for these understandable reactions and emotions"); Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) ("the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, 
providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion"). 
102. See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) (expressing concern 
that, without public access to criminal trials, "natural human reactions of outrage and protest are 
frustrated and may manifest themselves in some form of vengeful self-help"). 
103. Cf. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972) (use of videotaped confes-
sion is superior to a written statement because jury could tell if defendant was hesitant or uncer-
tain). But see Note, supra note 61, at 1554 (arguing that the presence of cameras can create 
witness nervousness that a jury might erroneously interpret as uncertainty or dishonesty). 
104. See text at notes 80-82 supra. 
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C. Maintaining a Proper Balance 
The preceding discussion has attempted to sketch the policy argu-
ments both in favor and against cameras in the courtroom. While 
there are clearly first amendment values promoted by televised trials, 
there is also the potential danger that trial participants will be 
prejudiced and judicial integrity undermined: Interests in privacy, 
fairness, judicial efficiency and even public education necessitate that 
strict limitations be imposed on those broadcasters permitted to tele-
vise criminal trials. 105 Traditional notions of the place of criminal tri-
als in our society further support limitations on cameras in the 
courtroom. The primary purpose of a criminal trial is to provide the 
defendant with an impartial forum in which the truth will emerge, 106 
not to educate or entertain the public.107 States have an overriding 
interest in preserving the dignity and solemnity of the courtroom and 
should develop guidelines that further these goals.1os 
105. Many courts and commentators agree that these interests must be weighed more heavily 
than the relevant first amendment values. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 
501, 508 (1984) (''No right ranks higher than the right of the accused to a fair trial.") (emphasis 
added); K.PNX Broadcasting v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 257, 678 P.2d 431, 442 (1984) 
(Feldman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("In those exceptional cases in which we are 
forced to choose between First and Sixth Amendment rights, the balance weighs most in favor of 
the Sixth Amendment when the information withheld is information which may subject jurors to 
influence, prejudice or pressure which may affect jury deliberations. The trial court's power in 
the balance between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights is therefore at its greatest 
when dealing with jury problems. It may even impose regulations that prevent the press from 
obtaining the names and addresses of the jurors."); State v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 395 
So. 2d 544, 549 (Fla. 1981) ("[I]t remains essential for trial judges to err on the side of fair trial 
rights for both the state and the defense. The electronic media's presence in Florida's court-
rooms is desirable but not indispensable."); MINN. REPORT, supra note 6, at 9 ("The Commis-
sioners, petitioners and the opponents of video and audio coverage of trial court proceedings who 
appeared before the Commission as "Interested Parties" all accept the fact that, where a likeli-
hood exists of a conflict between the rights of a litigant to a fair and public trial and the desire of 
the media for video and audio coverage of the proceedings, the former must prevail."); Note, 
supra note 57, at 929; Comment, The Prejudicial Effects of Cameras ill the Courtroom, 16 U. 
RICH. L. REv. 867, 874-76 (1981-82). See gellerally Patzer, Cameras ill the Courtroom: The 
Ka11Sas Oppositioll, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 230 (1978-79) (discussing the balancing process between 
sixth and first amendment interests in having media present in the courtroom). 
Others believe that a balance in favor of the defendant is less obvious. In Bridges v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 252 (1941), Justice Black stated that "free speech and fair trials are two of the most 
cherished policies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose between them." 314 
U.S. at 260. 
106. See Douglas, supra note 43, at 2-3 ("The courtroom by our traditions is a quiet place 
where the search for truth by earnest, dedicated men goes on in a dignified atmosphere."). 
107. See Douglas, supra note 43, at 5; Gaines & Stuplinski, supra note 6, at 298 ("The func-
tion of a trial ... is 'not to provide an educational experience,' but to resolve the dispute between 
the parties in conformity with constitutional standards and with concern for procedural and 
substantive fairness.") (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 575 (1965) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring)). 
108. See Juo. CoNF. REP., supra note 40, at 5-9 (Noting the threat of cameras in the court-
room to human rights, privacy, and the search for truth, and concluding that the ban on photog-
raphy and broadcasting in federal court proceedings should not be lifted); Douglas, supra note 
43, at 5 (Justice Douglas opposing extension of photography, television, and broadcasting into 
the courtroom, arguing that they would transform a trial into "as much of a spectacle as if it 
were held in the Yankee Stadium or the Roman Coliseum"); Corry, Rape Trial Covered Live by 
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Ill. STATE GUIDELINES AND THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY 
A. Major Areas Differentiating State Guidelines 
495 
States experimenting with televised trials have adopted guidelines 
to direct their judges confronted with requests to televise. These 
guidelines represent varying accommodations of the constitutional and 
policy interests outlined in Parts I and II. The substantive differences 
among the guidelines lie in several areas: (1) the effect of an objection 
from a litigant or witness on the decision whether to televise the trial 
or the objector's testimony; (2) whether the jury should be televised; 
(3) whether certain types of trials should be off-limits to broadcasters; 
( 4) procedural rules including whether there should be review of the 
pretrial decision allowing or excluding cameras; and (5) the extent to 
which broadcasters should be subject to an obligation of balanced re-
porting. Some of these guideline provisions are discussed below; 
others are simply included in the proposed model guidelines without 
discussion because they are technical rules that most states have 
adopted and found successful. 
1. Consent 
State guidelines vary as to whether parties or witnesses can pre-
clude broadcasting of their testimony or the entire trial. The best com-
promise of the various rules is that presented by the District of 
Columbia committee evaluating cameras in the courtroom.109 This 
committee suggests that no party would be granted the unilateral right 
to prevent broadcasters from televising trial proceedings. Witnesses, 
on the other hand, would be given the power to preclude the televising 
of their testimony.110 
In their initial experiments with cameras, many states granted the 
defendant a right to limit or preclude broadcasting in order to provide 
maximum protection for the nonconsenting defendant. Although 
seven states still require the defendant's consent as an absolute precon-
dition for televising a criminal trial, 111 most states have rejected this 
Cable Network, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1984, at C22, col. 5 ("Television, simply by being at an 
event, can rob it of solemnity and meaning."). 
109. D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 14-20. 
110. Id. at 7, 14-20. This provision is embodied in the proposed model guidelines. See Ap-
pendix, section IV(b), infra. 
111. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-10. An "absolute" precondition means that the party's 
refusal precludes the televising of any portion of the trial. A "limited" precondition means that 
the party's refusal precludes the televising of his or her testimony only. The following data lists 
the number of states that place absolute or limited preconditions on the televising of their crimi-
nal trials: Witness' consent is an absolute precondition (1 state); witness' consent is a limited 
precondition (14 states); juror's consent is an absolute precondition (0 states); juror's consent is a 
limited precondition (7 states); defendant's consent is an absolute precondition (7 states); defen-
dant's consent is a limited precondition (3 states); prosecutor's consent is an absolute precondi-
tion (5 states); prosecutor's consent is a limited precondition (0 states). Id. at B-8 to B-18. 
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requirement. Those states rejecting it found that, contrary to the in-
tent of the experiment, a defendant's consent requirement effectively 
barred the televising of all trials. 112 While it is disturbing to deprive 
the defendant of a veto because of practical considerations, certain 
limitations on the media, to be discussed below, can ensure that televi-
sion does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. These include: (1) 
prohibiting filming of the jury; 113 (2) prohibiting broadcasting of cer-
tain sensitive trials; 114 (3) requiring a pretrial hearing)n which the 
defendant can raise objections;115 and (4) granting the accused a pre-
trial right to appeal a decision to allow cameras.116 \ 
Conversely, fourteen states wisely allow witnesses to bai\ the tele-
vising of their own testimony. 117 States justify the distinction between 
witnesses and defendants by noting the differences in circumstances 
leading to their attendance in court. The District of Columbia com-
mittee points out that "certain witnesses, such as victims of violent 
crimes, police informants, and defense witnesses who are reluctant to 
'get involved' with the criminal process, will be adversely affected if 
their testimony is televised."118 Television coverage, it is argued, may 
increase the risk that these witnesses will become "unavailable" or will 
alter their testimony. 119 Defendants, on the other hand, will be pres-
ent for trial despite any reluctance to be televised.120 Moreover, any 
incentive on the part of the defendant to fabricate testimony arises 
from the defendant's predicament, not from the presence of cameras. 
Therefore, television coverage of the defendant's testimony does not 
threaten the same damage to the criminal justice system as does the 
televising of a witness' testimony.121 
Some states provide that a judge may in his discretion prohibit tel-
112. States that changed their rule froni requiring to not requiring consent of the defendant 
include Florida, Hawaii, Colorado, California and Louisiana. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at A· 
12 to A-16, A-23 to A-24, A-26 to A-27, A-38 to A-39; D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 18 ("A 
realistic appraisal of the effect of the party-consent requirement suggests that it will lead to the 
broadcast of very few trials."). 
113. See notes 125-37 infra and accompanying text. 
114. See notes 138-56 infra and accompanying text. 
115. Cf. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 511 (1981) (discussing Florida's procedure). 
116. See notes 161-72 infra and accompanying text. 
117. States that have adopted this provision are Alabama, Alaska (except victims of sexual 
offenses), Arkansas, Iowa (victims of sexual abuse only), Kansas, Maryland (victims only), Min-
nesota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington. See 
RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-15 to B-16. 
118. D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 14. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 16. 
121. The notion that witnesses in criminal trials must be encouraged to come forward and 
offer their testimony is not a novel one. The Victim and Witnesses Protection Act § 4(a), 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1512-15 (1982), is but one example of a statute designed to encourage witnesses to 
testify in criminal cases. 
Some commentators also contend that witnesses deserve extra protection because they retain 
more of their right to privacy than do defendants. See Tongue & Lintott, The Case Against 
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evision coverage of an objecting witness upon a showing of good cause 
by the witness.122 A fiat rule requiring judges to ban the televising of 
an objecting witness' testimony123 is preferable because it enables at-
torneys to assure reluctant witnesses before trial that they will not be 
televised against their will. 124 Such prior assurance will increase the 
likelihood of gaining the cooperation of witnesses which is so critical 
to the criminal justice process. 
2. Limitations on Broadcasting the Jury 
Filming the jury, during the trial and during voir dire, poses such 
serious dangers that it should be banned.125 Televising the jury can 
impinge on its impartiality and thus threaten the fairness of the trial. 
Those who view jurors on television may harass them, attempting to 
influence their decision.126 By causing an increase in outside pressure, 
broadcasting can enable public opinion to become an "unwanted and 
powerful thirteenth juror."121 
Another concern is that broadcasting will distract the jury, both 
inside and outside the courtroom. Inside, the jurors' attention may be 
distracted by the physical noise of the cameras or the mere knowledge 
that they are being filmed. 128 Outside, the jurors may be tempted to 
watch themselves. on television, despite the judge's order not to read or 
Television in the Courtroom, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 777, 792-94 (1980); Note, supra note 57, 
at 917-18. 
122. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-15 to B-16. States that do not require witnesses' con-
sent to televise their testimony are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland (except victims), Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. 
123. States that prohibit the televising of an objecting witness' testimony are Alabama, 
Alaska; Arkansas, Iowa (victims of sexual offenses only), Kansas (police informant, juvenile wit-
ness or victim/witness, undercover agent, relocated witness), Maryland (victims only), Minne-
sota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington. Id .. 
124. See "Television in the Courtroom," supra note 6, at 41 (statement of Herald Price Fahr-
inger, General Counsel, First Amendment Lawyers Association) ("[M]any witnesses will resist 
coming to court if they know their testimony will be viewed by hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple."); Tongue & Lintott, supra note 121, at 792 (describing how television aggravates a lawyer's 
difficult task of inducing a witness to appear in the courtroom voluntarily); D.C. REPORT, supra 
note 77, at 15. But see Note, supra note 25, at 408 (arguing that courts should require a witness 
to offer a legitimate reason for refusing consent). 
125. See Appendix, sections IV(a) & V infra. 
126. See Estes v. Texas, 381U.S.532, 546 (1965) (If depicted on television, jurors "would be 
subjected to the broadest commentary and criticism and perhaps the well-meant advice of 
friends, relatives and inquiring strangers who recognize them on the streets."); see also Cotsirilos 
& Jenner, supra note 78, at 60 ("The experience of viewing a trial, unlike reading reports in the 
printed media, causes a person to feel more knowledgeable about the trial and leads to stronger 
opinions concerning the 'correct' outcome. It is a near certainty the jurors will be approached by 
such people and will become engaged in discussions about the trial."). 
127. Note, supra note 57, at 928; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966) 
("The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by 
evidence and argument in open court and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or 
public print.") (quoting Justice Holmes in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907)). 
128. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545-47 (1965); Part II. A. 1 supra. For the suggestion 
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watch reports of the trial.129 Jurors who watch the broadcast may 
learn of evidence not admitted or see facts presented in a different 
light. At a minimum, they will receive additional exposure to those 
facts deemed most significant by the broadcasters. Such pollution of 
the fact-finding process raises grave policy and constitutional 
concerns. 
Furthermore, televising the jury during the trial may invade the 
jurors' legitimate interest in privacy.130 Of all the trial participants, 
jurors are most likely to be in court involuntarily. Jurors performing 
their civic duty should not have to be exposed to public scrutiny. Such 
exposure is of special concern with regard to voir dire, since judges 
(and in some states attorneys) often question jurors regarding highly 
personal matters.131 Jurors may be required to reveal, for example, 
information about their past associations or criminal behavior. The 
jurors' privacy is thus more easily threatened by the televising of voir 
dire proceedings in which they are active participants than by the 
broadcasting of a trial in which they are silent spectators. The set of 
model guidelines should therefore incorporate the rule already 
adopted by nine states prohibiting the televising of voir dire 
proceedings. 132 
that jurors are not distracted by the presence of cameras, see CAL. REPORT, supra note 58, at 
228; Fla. Report, supra note 3, at 768-69; LA. REPORT, supra note 58, at 2. 
129. See note 85 supra and accompanying text. 
130. Courts have recognized a juror's privacy interest as a valid concern that must be safe· 
guarded. The defendant, the state, and the juror herself may all share this interest. Recently, 
Justice Blackmun explained these interests, stating: 
[T]he defendant has an interest in protecting juror privacy in order to encourage honest 
answers to the voir dire questions. The State has a similar interest in protecting juror privacy 
even after the trial - to encourage juror honesty in the future - that almost always will be 
coextensive with the juror's own privacy interest. 
Press-Enterprises Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 515 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(footnote omitted). In Press Enterprises, however, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the jurors 
merely have an interest in privacy. The Justice "put off to another day consideration of whether 
and under what conditions that interest rises to the level of a constitutional right." 464 U.S. at 
516. See also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 353 (1966) ("The fact that anonymous letters 
had been received by prospective jurors should have made the judge aware that this publicity 
seriously threatened the jurors' privacy."); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(approving the trial court's decision to protect the anonymity of jurors in a narcotics case by 
refusing to make public their names and addresses), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980); KPNX 
Broadcasting v. Maricopa County Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 258, 678 P.2d 431, 443 (1984) 
(Feldman, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("In my view, the whole system is much 
better served if jurors are allowed a sense of privacy and anonymity."). 
131. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 514 (1984) ("[A] juror has a 
valid interest in not being required to disclose to all the world highly personal or embarrassing 
information simply because he is called to do his public duty."). 
132. The nine states are Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
New Mexico, North Carolina and Rhode Island. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-24. It should 
be noted that the Supreme Court has recently decided that the presumption of openness secured 
for the press and public by Richmond Newspapers, see notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text, 
extends as well to the voir dire examination of potential jurors in a criminal trial. Press-Enter-
prise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505-10 (1984). However, the Court merely established 
a presumption of openness; it refused to adopt a fiat rule mandating a right of access to voir dire 
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A ban on televising the jury is further supported by the fact that 
the benefits of broadcasting are few in the jury context. Televising the 
jury watching the trial contributes little to the public's understanding 
of judicial proceedings.133 In addition, filming of the jury in voir dire 
proceedings or at trial does little to advance the goal of judicial over-
sight. To protect truly against a "miscarriage of justice,"134 the public 
would need to witness the actual deliberations of the jury. Neither the 
televising of voir dire nor the broadcasting of jurors viewing the trial 
would enlighten the public as to whether the jury was adequately per-
forming its assigned role. 
Most states that permit cameras impose some restrictions on tele-
vising members of the jury. Some prohibit televising the jury alto-
gether, 135 while others prohibit filming in such a way that individual 
jurors are recognizable. 136 This rule prohibiting close-ups or "zoom-
ing in" on individual jurors offers some protection against outside 
pressure and interferences with privacy, and may curtail the juror's 
urge to watch the trial on television. However, reports have shown 
that this partial restriction is technologically difficult to implement.137 
Therefore, a total ban on jury broadcasting is more likely to guarantee 
an impartial jury and protect jurors' privacy. 
3. Limitations on Televising Highly Sensitive Trials 
The broadcasting media should be excluded from certain types of 
highly sensitive trials, 138 such as juvenile proceedings, 139 domestic re-
proceedings. Morever, as evidenced by the Court's decision not to extend Richmond Newspapers 
to the electronic media, see notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text, openness to the public does 
not necessarily mean that television coverage cannot be restricted. 
133. See Note, supra note 25, at 422 ("[P]hotographing the jury does not educate the public 
nor does such coverage help monitor the courts - it is exposure for exposure's sake .... The 
state's strong interest in protecting the jury from outside influence coupled with the negligible 
first amendment interests involved clearly justify banning the photographing of juries."). 
134. See note 98 supra and accompanying text. 
135. States that completely prohibit television coverage of the jury include Arkansas, Con-
necticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio and Utah. RTNDA, supra 
note 3, at B-10 to B-11. 
136. States that allow coverage of the jury but only in a manner that will prevent recognition 
of individual jurors include Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, and New 
Jersey. RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-17 to B-18. 
137. See CAL. REPORT, supra note 58, at 231. 
138. It should be noted that states that bar the media from sensitive criminal trials employ 
similar justifications to bar the media from especially sensitive civil trials. Thus, eight states bar 
the media from adoption proceedings, eleven states bar the media from child custody proceed-
ings, and eleven states bar the media from divorce proceedings. RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-19 
to B-21. Accordingly, the model guidelines proposed by this Note provide that the media should 
be precluded from televising all sensitive trials, whether criminal or civil. See Appendix, section 
II(b), infra. 
139. Thirteen states prohibit the televising of juvenile proceedings. See RTNDA, supra note 
3, at B-21; see also Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 101, 
102 (1958) ("privacy has typically been among the few unchallenged keynotes in juvenile pro-
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lations disputes, and sexual offenses, 140 in order to protect the privacy 
of the participants.141 Many state guidelines either mandate such an 
exclusion or state a presumption142 that such broadcasting should be 
prohibited. Other states leave the decision solely to the discretion of 
the judge.143 
Guidelines should require courts to exclude cameras from certain 
highly sensitive trials for the same reasons that they completely close 
them to the public and the print media. 144 Closing a trial may spare a 
witness, especially one who is a victim, embarrassment, harassment, or 
reprisal. Because trials involving sexual offenses typically raise sensi-
tive and personal matters, many courts exclude spectators at least dur-
ing the victim's testimony. 145 Judges presiding over trials involving 
children have also taken extra precautions.146 Indeed, there are a vari-
ety of protections afforded children - including the closure of juvenile 
proceedings147 - that acknowledge that children are more easily . 
scarred than adults both by crimes in which they are involved and by 
ceedings"); Note, supra note 25, at 421-22 ("[A]uthorities regard the confidentiality of juvenile 
proceedings as indispensable to the successful functioning of the juvenile system."). 
140. Eight states prohibit the televising of sexual offense trials. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at 
B-23; see also D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 7, 21-22 (arguing that no television coverage 
should be allowed in cases, such as sexual offense trials, which will likely invade litigants' privacy 
interests); Fla. Report, supra note 3, at 779 (arguing that it might be appropriate to prohibit the 
filming of sex crime victims, confidential informants, prisoners, and those involved in custody 
disputes). 
141. See D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 21-22 (discussing the types of trials most likely to 
invade the participants' privacy interests); see also State v. Gilroy, 313 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Iowa 
1981) (upholding exclusion from expanded media coverage of witness undercover agents in order 
to protect "effective and necessary Jaw enforcement processes"). 
142. States that have a presumption rule include Maryland and Wisconsin. See RTNDA, 
supra note 3, at B-20. 
143. An example of one such state is New Mexico. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-21. 
144. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (closure may be permit-
ted to conceal a victim's identity or protect her privacy); note 68 supra and accompanying text; 
note 139 infra. 
145. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 599 P.2d 199 (1979) (court excluded spectators 
during victim's testimony); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58 (R.I. 1980) (temporary exclusion of all 
spectators permissible during testimony of rape victim). 
In the New Bedford rape case, see note 96 supra, the judge ruled that neither the print nor the 
broadcast media could photograph the victim or reveal her name. Corry, supra note 108, at C22. 
Instead, viewers were to hear only the victim's "voice, flat and unemotional, responding to ques-
tions." Id. Unfortunately, the judge's ruling was inadvertently violated; because the coverage 
was live, the broadcaster was unable to prevent the transmission of the victim's name when it was 
spoken in open court. See Friendly, supra note 96, at C22. This highlights how difficult limited 
exclusion is to administer and the need to supervise the broadcast to ensure compliance with the 
judge's orders. 
146. See Boy, 7, Is Witness in Child Abuse Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1985, at A9, col. 1 
(spectators ordered to watch child's testimony on closed-circuit television; child's name edited 
out of the videotape). See generally Annot., 14 A.L.R.4th 121 §§ 2b, 7c (1982). 
147. Most states close juvenile court proceedings to the public, relying heavily on the impor-
tance of the privacy rights of the child. Sees. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 184-87 
(1984). The constitutionality of complete closure of juvenile proceedings is very much in doubt 
in light of Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). See note 75 supra. 
However, the fact that some access to juvenile proceedings may be required under certain cir-
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the judicial process itself.148 
Permitting the broadcasting of sensitive trials also creates broader 
crime-control problems. Victims of sexual offenses, for example, may 
opt not to report or prosecute crimes if they believe they will be tele-
vised at trial. 149 To encourage these victims to prosecute their attack-
ers, guidelines are needed that require judges not to permit the 
televising of particularly sensitive trials.150 
Although courts desire to make such decisions on a case-by-case 
basis, 151 leaving decisions to the judge's discretion subjects the victim's 
privacy interests to the whim of the judge. In Florida, for example, 
judges have refused requests not to be televised made by a widow of a 
murder victim, a prisoner in fear of retaliation, and a sixteen-year-old 
rape victim, on the ground that television broadcasting would not have 
a qualitatively different effect than newspaper reports. 152 These exam-
ples (especially the last) demonstrate the injustices made possible 
when judges, insensitive to the legitimate privacy concerns of litigants, 
are not constrained by rules mandating that privacy be protected.153 
The Supreme Court has ruled on this issue regarding the print me-
dia and the public. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 154 the 
Court overturned a state statute that uniformly excluded the public 
and press from trials of specified sexual offenses involving victims 
under the age of eighteen. The Court acknowledged that trial partici-
pants may have an interest in excluding the press during sensitive tri-
als, but held that the first amendment required that exclusion 
decisions be made on a case-by-case basis.155 The Seventh and Elev-
enth Circuits have held, however, that Globe does not prevent a ban on 
the televising of federal criminal trials. Such a ban, they held, merely 
limits one type of news coverage; in comparison, the statute struck 
cumstances does not mean that television coverage of such proceedings must be permitted. See 
notes 154-56 infra and accompanying text; cf. note 132 supra. 
148. See also Geis, supra note 139, at 102 ("the notoriety which would result from dissemina-
tion by mass media of the facts of a juvenile's case would tend to scar, rather than scare, him 
permanently and handicap his prospects for future adjustment and law-abiding behavior"). 
149. See Friendly, supra note 96, at C22 ("[T]he coverage of the rape in Big Dan's Tavern 
could 'terrorize' other victims and discourage them from reporting sexual assaults.") (quoting 
Senator Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican and a former district attorney). 
ISO. Cf. notes 122-24 supra and accompanying text; Appendix, section II(b), infra .. 
151. Indeed, the Supreme Court adopted such a case-by-case approach in Globe Newspaper 
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). See note 75 supra. Globe, however, did not involve 
the broadcasting of juvenile proceedings. See notes 154-56 infra and accompanying text. 
152. See Fla. Report, supra note 3, at 778; see also Hoyt, Prohibiting Courtroom Photography: 
It's Up to the Judge in Florida and Wisconsin, 63 JumCATURE 290 (1980); Note, supra note 25, 
at 406. 
153. Cf. note 6 supra. 
154. 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
155. See note 75 supra. 
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down in Globe prohibited all types of coverage. 156 Thus, Globe is prob-
ably not authority for striking down state guidelines that preclude 
cameras in highly sensitive cases. 
4. Procedural Safeguards 
Many state guidelines provide rules about notice - both that the 
court receive notice of a request to televise well before the actual trial 
date, 157 and that the court notify the parties of any request received. 158 
The first requirement enables the judge, during the few days before the 
trial, to address substantive matters undistracted by any media-related 
issues.159 The second requirement insures that the parties will not be 
surprised at trial by the broadcaster and will be prepared to raise any 
objections that, under Chandler v. Florida, they have a right to make 
at the pretrial hearing.160 
In addition to requiring notice, guidelines should allow the defen-
dant to make an interlocutory appeal of a pretrial decision to permit 
broadcasting. Until Chandler, the Supreme Court maintained that a 
post-trial appeal was a poor remedy for an accused. 161 However, the 
Chandler Court, while requiring that the defendant be given an oppor-
tunity to voice objections to coverage,162 upheld Florida's rule under 
which the only opportunity to challenge the decision to televise was on 
appeal, 163 after any damage had already been done. 
Chandler did acknowledge that coverage may adversely affect the 
conduct of trial participants and the fairness of the trial without leav-
ing evidence that such prejudice occurred.164 It thus may be impossi-
ble to prove after the fact that a trial was unfair as a result of the 
156. See United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983). 
157. See RTNDA, supra note 3, at B-8 to B-9 (listing thirty-five states that require prior 
notice). 
158. See, e.g., ARIZ. CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(f) (Sup. Ct. R. 81 1985); 
low A CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 3A(7) (Rules of Procedure for Expanded Media 
Coverage 3(b) 1985). 
159. Letter from Judge Murray Richtel to the Subcommittee on Model Rules for Expanded 
Media Coverage (Jan. 11, 1985), at 2. 
160. 449 U.S. 560, 577 (1981). 
161. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 555 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 
U.S. 333, 363 (1966); Comment, supra note 20, at 330-31 ("Nebraska Press • •. indicated that a 
less desirable alternative to restricting first amendment press rights is reliance on appellate review 
as a means of redressing fair trial violations resulting from prejudicial publicity."), 
162. See note 160 supra and accompanying text. 
163. 449 U.S. at 581. For a criticism of the Chandler position on interlocutory appeals, see 
Note, supra note 105, at 867-68. 
164. Inherent in electronic coverage of a trial is the risk that the very awareness by the 
accused of the coverage and the contemplated broadcast may adversely affect the conduct of 
the participants and the fairness of the trial, yet leave no evidence of how the conduct or the 
trial's fairness was affected. 
449 U.S. at 577. 
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broadcasting. Nonetheless, the Court placed the burden on the de-
fendant to prove that the televising was prejudicial.165 This difficult 
burden is made even more onerous by the high standard of appellate 
review of discretionary trial court decisions.166 Limiting the defen-
dant's relief to a post-conviction appeal may thus offer little benefit to 
the defendant whose conviction has already been broadcast nation-
wide.167 Although interlocutory appeals can crowd appellate court 
dockets and delay trials, they are warranted when legitimate claims 
may be jeopardized if not heard and appealed before trial. 168 
The District of Columbia Bar report recommends a rule under 
which a party would have the right to an interlocutory appeal of a 
pretrial decision allowing coverage, but the media and nonparties 
would be denied a similar right to appeal a pretrial decision barring 
coverage.169 Prohibiting interlocutory appeal on a decision to bar the 
media reduces the delay before the trial. 170 The compromise also 
shows proper deference for the accused over the interests of the me-
dia.171 Few would doubt that the damage to. the defendant of an im-
proper decision allowing cameras is greater than the damage to the 
public of the converse decision. The public will learn of the trial from 
newspapers and television reports even without the live broadcast.172 
165. 449 U.S. at 575, 581-83. 
166. See Lasley v. State, 274 Ark. 352, 357, 625 S.W.2d 466, 469 (1981). 
167. D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 19, 20. Few state guidelines discuss the interlocutory 
appeal issue. Some states explicitly deny the defendant or the media the right to appeal the 
court's determination before trial. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l IOA, § 6l(c)(24) (Smith-Hurd 
1985), amended by In re Photographing, Broadcasting, and Televising Proceedings in the Courts 
of Illinois, MR No. 2634 (Nov. 29, 1983) (adopted on a permanent basis by order entered Jan. 
22, 1985); In re Canon 3A(7), 9 MEDIA L. REP. 1778, 1779 (Minn. 1983). 
168. The federal courts generally disfavor interlocutory appeals. Interlocutory appeals as of 
right are limited by statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1982), while discretionary appeals, 28 
u.s.c. § 1292(b) (1982), are rarely granted, see J. COUND, J. FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER, & J. 
SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 1034 n.5 (4th ed. 1985). Many states, 
however, have more liberal provisions for interlocutory appeals. See, e.g., MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 
103.03; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW AND R. 5701 (providing for "appeal ... as of right ... from an 
order •.. [that] affects a substantial right"). 
169. D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 19-20. 
170. See D.C. REPORT, supra note 77, at 19 (citing In re Canon 3A(7), 9 Media L. Rep. 
(BNA) 1778, 1779 (Minn. 1983) and In re Canon 3A(7), 5 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2609, 2611 
(Nev. 1980)). 
171. See Parts II. A. 2 and C supra. 
172. See United States v. Kerley, 753 F.2d 617, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1280-82 (I Ith Cir. 1983); "Television in the Courtroom," supra note 6, 
at 42 (The public is being adequately informed about criminal prosecutions by newspaper cover-
age and the filming outside the precincts of the courtroom. Journalists have always been free to 
report the most minute details and events of a trial. Excluding cameras from the courtroom will 
not infringe upon the public's right to know about criminal prosecutions.). 
Some challenge this argument on the ground that it discriminates against broadcasters in 
favor of the print media. See Ares, supra note 32, at 175-78. This complaint was effectively 
countered in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965), where the court argued that the "television 
and radio reporter has the same privilege. All are entitled to the same rights as the general 
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5. Limitations on Reporting 
Distortion in reporting trials is a serious concern with broadcast-
ing.113 Some fear that trials will be presented in a fashion most likely 
to entertain.174 Others fear that broadcasters will, as in Chandler v. 
Florida, 115 present only one side of the case, thereby distorting the 
public's understanding of the proceeding and reducing the educational 
value of the broadcast.116 
Given the length of many trials and the high cost of television 
time, a requirement that the entire trial be broadcast is probably un-
realistic.177 On the other hand, a requirement of balanced reporting is 
both realistic and appropriate. Admittedly, such a restriction would 
probably be unconstitutional as applied to the print media. 178 How-
ever, the difference in impact between the two media179 justifies a re-
quirement that broadcasters offer a balanced presentation of criminal 
trials. 
A requirement of balanced reporting that applies only to broad-
casting is not foreign to our system of media regulation. For example, 
the federal election laws require that "[i]f any licensee shall permit any 
person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a 
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other 
such candidates for that office .... " 180 Such equal time and space 
provisions are not required of newspapers. 181 Similarly, the FCC's 
fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to cover public issues ade-
quately, and, in so doing, provide for the expression of opposing 
views.182 The fairness doctrine may not constitutionally be applied to 
public. The news reporter is not permitted to bring in [to court] his typewriter or printing 
press." 
173. See Tongue & Lintott, supra note 121, at 785; Gerbner, supra note 6. 
174. See MINN. REPORT, supra note 6, at 10 ("[Opponents of video and audio coverage] 
believe that the media, in deciding what to cover, is much more concerned with the sensational, 
the frequently prurient interests of the public and with what will perhaps improve the ratings of 
one television ..• or radio station as compared to its competitors."). 
175. 449 U.S. 560, 568 (1981). 
176. See "Television in the Courtroom," supra note 6, at 35-36 (statement of G. Barasch, 
Conference Chairman); Cotsirilos & Jenner, supra note 78, at 59 ("Pity the poor accused who has 
been found not guilty only to return to a community that viewed selected and edited portions of 
his trial reflecting only the prosecution's case, as was done in Chandler."); notes 88-89 supra and 
accompanying text. 
177. See Juo. CONF. REP., supra note 40, at 7 ("Economic considerations and time con-
straints preclude the universal televising of entire trials, requiring selection of trials and parts of 
trials sufficiently sensational to attract viewers."). 
178. See note 183 infra. 
179. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text. 
180. The Communications Act of 1934 § 315, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982). 
181. See Bollinger, supra note 79, at 272-75. 
182. See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1969); see also Bollinger, 
supra note 79, at 274-75; Zimmerman, supra note 35, at 642-43. The fairness doctrine received 
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the print media. 183 Such provisions acknowledge the differences be-
tween the two kinds of media and accordingly provide stricter rules to 
ensure balanced reporting by television broadcasters.184 
A balanced reporting provision should require broadcasters to ex-
press the arguments of both the defendant and the prosecution. It 
need not require strict equal time in reporting as imposed on television 
by the election laws,185 because this would prove unworkable in a judi-
cial proceeding. For example, it might not be clear to broadcasters 
which side a particular witness' testimony will ultimately benefit. In 
addition broadcasters would have to decide how many minutes to 
devote to the prosecutor's case without knowing the length of the de-
fendant's presentation. Nonetheless, a general requirement of bal-
anced reporting would help eliminate the most egregious distortions of 
criminal trials; distortions that can jeopardize the fairness of the trial 
and minimize the public's opportunity to understand the judicial 
process. 
6. Technical Rules 
States have devised a variety of rules aimed at limiting the physical 
distractions caused by cameras in the courtroom. Although specific 
requirements vary from state to state, these technical rules are rarely 
congressional sanction in a 1959 amendment of the Communication Act. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) 
(1982). 
183. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (a Florida statute 
that grants a political candidate equal space to reply to criticisms by a newspaper violates the first 
amendment guarantee of a free press). See generally Barrow, The Fairness Doctrine: A Double 
Standard for Electronic and Print Media, 26 HAsTINGS L.J. 659, 665-91 (1975). 
184. Several theories are offered to justify the disparate treatment of newspapers and televi-
sion. See generally Bollinger, supra note 79. One theory is that the airwaves are a limited re-
source, such that only a certain number of stations can effectively communicate at any given 
time. Thus regulations should be imposed to ensure that the few stations that do have the privi-
lege to broadcast do not present the public with a one-sided view of important issues. See Red 
Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969) (adopting the "physical scarcity" rationale). 
But see Bollinger, supra note 79, at 273 ("[Ejverything is scarce, including all those things used by 
newspapers and magazines for that particular form of communication (newsprint, metal and the 
like).") (emphasis in original). A second theory asserted is that broadcasters are public trustees 
and fiduciaries and thus should be regulated in the public interest. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 
383, 389-90. A third justification for regulation is known as the "impact" thesis, which asserts 
that television messages have a subliminal impact that can undermine viewers' rationality and 
make the message seem more believable than if read. See Banzhaffv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100-
01 & n.77 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969); see generally Bollinger, Elitism, the 
Masses and the Meaning of the First Amendment, in CoNSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN 
AMERICA 99 (R. Collins ed. 1980) (noting that, of all media, television is suspected of having the 
greatest impact on the largest audience). Finally, some courts justify restrictions as necessary to 
protect viewers who are in certain respects a "captive audience." See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 
438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Natl. Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
127 (1973). This rationale is closely related to the assertion that because the television set is 
located in the home, a place in which the privacy interests of the audience are entitled to extra 
deference, heightened regulation is required to ensure the propriety of the broadcasting material. 
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749 & n.27. 
185. See note 180 supra and accompanying text. 
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in controversy in debates over media access. Reports from states ex-
perimenting with televised trials have found that such rules help mini-
mize distractions and thus serve to provide fairer trials.186 
Examples of technical rules include (1) prohibiting the changing of 
camera lenses during the trial; (2) requiring media pooling so that only 
one camera is in the courtroom at any given time; (3) requiring 
camerapersons to dress appropriately for the proceeding; and (4) 
prohibiting insignias on either the cameras or clothes of the broadcast-
ers that identify the station. 187 Judge Murray Richtel, chairman of the 
National Conference of State Trial Judges committee responsible for 
drafting model rules for electronic coverage of trials, 188 favors the ad-
ditional requirement that photographers remain in the courtroom 
throughout the proceedings: "I [want] them to stay because if the ju-
rors [see] them coming and going they might [be] given the impression 
that one part of the trial [is] more important than the other .... " 189 
B. The Merits of a Uniform Set of Guidelines 
All states should adopt the model guidelines proposed in the Ap-
pendix to this Note, not only because they properly balance the con-
flicting constitutional and policy interests involved in the cameras in 
the courtroom debate, but also because uniformity in this area is itself 
a worthy goal. 
In contrast to the rules governing civil procedure, 190 there is cur-
rently no uniform set of rules of criminal procedure generally accepted 
by most states.191 Nonetheless, efforts have been made in this direc-
tion. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) adopted uniform rules of criminal procedure in 
1974.192 Other groups such as the American Law Institute and Amer-
186. See, e.g., Fla. Report, supra note 3, at 18; MINN. REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
187. Almost every state has a similar set of technical rules designed to minimize physical 
distractions. See, e.g., ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(n)-(s) (1985); CONN. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7A)(9) (1986); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3A(7) (1985). 
188. See note 9 supra. 
189. Reaves, Cameras in Court, 69 A.B.A. J. 1213 (1983). 
190. As of 1979, well over half the states had civil rules closely patterned after the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rowe, A Comment on the Federalism of the Federal Rules, 1919 
DUKE L.J. 843, 843 (citing c. WRIGHT & F. ELLIOT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
INTERIM PAMPHLET TO JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATIERS §§ 9-9.53 (1977)). In addi-
tion, the movement toward adoption of the federal rules continues in some nonconforming states. 
Id. at 843. 
191. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have served as a model for rules of criminal 
procedure in only 18 jurisdictions. See R. CHAPIN, supra note 6, at 8. For an excellent discussion 
of the merits of uniform rules of criminal procedure, see id. at 17-19. 
192. UNIF. R. CRIM. P., 10 U.L.A. (1974). "The object of the National Conference, as stated 
in its constitution, is 'to promote uniformity in state laws on all subjects where uniformity is 
deemed desirable and practicable.' " Id. at III. The set of criminal procedure rules adopted by 
the Conference, however, does not directly address the issue of televised trials. The only refer-
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ican Bar Association have also promulgated draft codes, rules and 
standards in an effort to improve state rules of criminal procedure.193 
There are three advantages of a uniform set of rules for cameras in 
state criminal trials. First, they would ensure fairness; second, they 
would promote judicial efficiency; and third, they would benefit those 
broadcasters that operate across interstate lines. The principal objec-
tion to uniform rules, that federalism might be threatened, is not suffi-
ciently certain or compelling to outweigh the benefits. 
First, uniform rules would serve to ensure fairness in criminal tri-
als by treating those accused consistently from state to state.194 Uni-
form rules of procedure regarding the broadcasting of trials would 
raise the visibility of the cameras in the courtroom issue, provide cer-
tainty of procedures, and help eliminate the perception of arbitrary 
actions by the courts. Uniform rules would also help prevent "favorit-
ism, corruption, and local prejudice."t9s 
Second, the adoption of one set of rules to govern televised trials 
would promote judicial efficiency. With only one set of state guide-
lines to construe, the Supreme Court and other appellate tribunals 
could more easily assure compliance with first, sixth, and fourteenth 
amendment requirements.196 If the Supreme Court were to uphold 
the uniform set of rules, as it did the Florida guidelines in Chandler, 197 
the number of appeals would be reduced. Parties could still challenge 
the interpretation and application of the rules (e.g., argue that the 
judge abused his or her discretion), but could no longer challenge the 
validity of the rules themselves. Efficiency would also be increased in 
the separate states. As the uniform guidelines became more accepted, 
states considering cameras in the courtroom would not have to con-
duct their own experiments and evaluations.198 Instead, they could be 
assured that the guidelines worked merely by the number of states us-
ing them successfully. 
Third, uniform rules offer benefits to broadcasters. Almost all cur-
rent state guidelines consist of complex rules containing both proce-
dural requirements and technical rules regulating equipment. The 
major broadcasters are interstate networks and are likely to be inter-
ested in broadcasting trials in various states. Under the current sys-
tem, the network must carefully study the guidelines of the particular 
ence in the model rules to broadcasting appears in section 714(e), which provides that sound and 
visual recordings of closed trial proceedings may be shown publicly after the trial. Id. at 319. 
193. See R. CHAPIN, supra note 6, at 7. 
194. See id. at 29. 
195. See id. 
196. See id. at 17 n.73. 
197. See notes 15-25 supra and accompanying text. 
198. Almost all states considering cameras in their courts have gone through a lengthy pe-
riod of experimentation and evaluation. States issuing comprehensive reports include California, 
Florida, Hawaii, Minnesota, Washington and Wisconsin. 
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state in which it seeks to televise. Given the variety of equipment 
specifications, this may entail using certain equipment in one state and 
different equipment in others. Notice requirements also differ mark-
edly from state to state; the time period within which a broadcaster 
must file a request to televise ranges from one day in advance of trial 
in Colorado,199 to fourteen days in advance of trial in Iowa,200 to a 
"reasonable time before" trial in California.201 A uniform set of guide-
lines would ease these burdens by requiring stations to master only one 
set of rules. 
The most commonly asserted challenge to uniformity is that it 
threatens federalism. Imposed uniformity diminishes the value of 
states as laboratories for the development of innovative approaches 
and overrides values that are the primary responsibilities of the 
states.202 Indeed, in Chandler the Supreme Court explicitly lauded the 
value of state experimentation in this area.203 
There are two responses to this concern. First, federalism will not 
be impaired because the rules, rather than being imposed by constitu-
tional amendment or judicial fiat, will be available for states to adopt 
or reject.204 The Supreme Court's desire to encourage state experi-
mentation does not mean that it disapproves of a state's informed deci-
sion to adopt rules similar to those used in other states. Second, the 
fact that the Supreme Court in Chandler has taken a states' rights 
approach and praised the benefits of experimentation does not mean 
199. COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(8), 7A COLO. REV. STAT. (Supp. 
1984) (temporary two-year provision adopted in 1983). 
200. IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 3A(7) (1984). 
201. 23 CAL. CIV. & CRIM. CT. R. 980(b)(l) (West 1981) (Supp. 1985). 
Connecticut requires notice at least three days before trial, see CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CoNDUCT, Canon 3(A)(7A)(3) (1984); Kansas, one week before trial, see KAN. CODE OF JUDI· 
CIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(7) (1986); and Nebraska, ten days before trial, see In re Media 
Coverage of Proceedings Before the Nebraska Supreme Court, slip op. at 3 (Neb. Oct. 1, 1982) 
(temporary one-year provision). 
202. See R. CHAPIN, supra note 6, at 22 (describing the argument that imposed uniformity 
by a constitutional amendment would destroy state sovereignty and erode the principle of 
federalism). 
203. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 578-79 (1981). See notes 20-25 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
204. A flier distributed by the National Conference on Uniform State Laws makes clear that 
states are totally free to adopt or reject the uniform laws passed by the Conference. In any event, 
some commentators argue that "federalism has outlived its usefulness," R. CHAPIN, supra note 6, 
at 23-24 (describing position taken by some proponents of uniformity), and should not stand in 
the way of an improved nationwide criminal justice system. As one commentator puts it, 
there is abundant evidence that federalism has not worked very well in guaranteeing the 
rights of the criminally accused to an impartial trial • • • . Earlier Supreme Courts have 
recognized the limits of federalism, and have given the accused the specific safeguards 
against improper confession, illegal searches and denial of counsel. Present and future 
Supreme Courts have a continuing responsibility in this area - "fundamental fairness" 
requires national standards. 
Dubnoff, Publicity and Due Process in Criminal Proceedings, 92 PoL. Sci. Q. 89, 108 (1977). 
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that its position is immune .to challenge. 205 In fact, the Chandler view 
represents a switch in the Court's position regarding state activities 
that involve constitutional rights.206 When constitutional rights have 
been implicated in the past, the Court has prescribed criminal proce-
dure rules that states must follow to insure the protection of those 
rights.207 Thus, the Court has required specific safeguards against im-
proper confessions,208 illegal searches,209 and denial of counsel.210 
Proponents of the pre-Chandler approach in situations involving con-
stitutional rights properly view uniformity as a desirable solution to 
the Court's refusal to promulgate guidelines in this area. 
CONCLUSION 
In the last two decades there has been an explosion in the number 
of states that permit televising of their criminal trials. The Supreme 
Court, while not endorsing this development, has allowed it to occur. 
But the Court's hesitant position, along with the ever-present federal 
ban against televising federal criminal trials, has left states without 
guidance as to the proper way to accommodate the various constitu-
tional and policy interests of the trial participants, media, and public. 
As a result, there are almost as many variations in guidelines as there 
are states allowing coverage. Uniformity is needed. 
The absence of a first amendment right of television access on the 
one hand, and the potential of broadcasting to impair the fairness of 
the trial and invade the privacy interests of trial participants and ju-
rors on the other hand, suggest that any state that permits televised 
205. [The Court's] deference to the states which rings so harmoniously to ears tuned to 
rejecting claims of "substantive due process" seems strangely jolting when offered as a re-
sponse to a claim that a state's criminal procedure has violated due process. The recitation 
of Justice Brandeis's familiar statement of federalism . . . hardly seems an adequate 
justification. 
Ares, supra note 32, at 159 (citation omitted). 
206. The Burger analysis departs substantially from the recurring concerns and analytical 
schemes incorporated into prior Court decisions which involved fair trial rights and the 
rights of the press ..•• 
. . • In the area of due process rights, the Court has often refused to accept state guide-
lines as sufficiently protective of an accused's constitutional rights. 
Comment, supra note 20, at 325, 326 n.72. 
207. See Dubnoff, supra note 204, at 89 ("Much of the controversy surrounding the Warren 
Court centered on its willingess to 'federalize' rules of criminal procedure."); Comment, supra 
note 20, at 326 ("Chandler thereby appears to subject broadcasters and defendants alike to poten-
tially arbitrary and inconsistent treatment by various state courts. By disavowing any constitu-
tional right of access, the Court has permitted the electronic media to get one foot inside the 
courtroom door, but has failed to lay a basis for the states to proceed uniformly in developing 
procedures and safeguards for the broadcasting of trials. The Court justifies shifting this respon-
sibility to the states by citing sophisticated technology and state-imposed due process safeguards. 
The latter, at least, was viewed by prior Supreme Court decisions as wholly inadequate to sup-
port such a reliance on the states.") (footnotes omitted). 
208. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
209. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
210. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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trials should be cautious not to give the media too much latitude once 
in the courtroom. The model guidelines proposed in the Appendix to 
this Note strike the proper balance between the conflicting interests 
and should therefore be considered by any state permitting or experi-
menting with television coverage of its criminal trials. 
APPENDIX 
PROPOSED MODEL GUIDELINES 
Subject at all times to the authority of the Judge to 
(i) control the conduct of proceedings before the Court; 
(ii) ensure decorum and prevent distractions; and 
(iii) ensure the fair administration of justice in the pending case, 
electronic media and still photography coverage of public judicial pro-
ceedings in the Courts of this state may be allowed in accordance with 
standards of conduct and technology adopted by the Supreme Court 
of ____ . 
(I) DEFINITIONS 
"Judicial proceedings" or "proceedings" as referred to in these 
rules shall include all public trials, hearings or other proceedings in a 
trial or appellate court, for which expanded media coverage is re-
quested, except those specifically excluded by these rules. 
"Expanded media coverage" includes broadcasting, televising, 
electronic recording or photographing of judicial proceedings for the 
purpose of gathering and disseminating news to the public. 
"Judge" means the magistrate, district associate judge, or district 
judge presiding in a trial court proceeding or the presiding judge or 
justice in an appellate proceeding. 
(II) STANDARDS FOR AUTHORIZING COVERAGE 
(a) The judge has discretion to allow or deny expanded media cov-
erage. In making that decision, the judge should consider the 
following factors: 
1. whether there is a reasonable likelihood that expanded me-
dia coverage would interfere with the rights of the parties 
to a fair trial; or 
2. whether there is a reasonable likelihood that expanded me-
dia coverage would unduly detract from the solemnity, de-
corum and dignity of the court.2 11 
211. For similar state provisions, see, e.g., ALASKA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3A(7)(a) in ALASKA RULES OF COURT (1985); ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3A(7)(b) in ARIZ. RULES OF COURT (1985); COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3A(8)(b) in COLO. COURT RULES (1984) (temporary); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3A(7)(c)(ii) in OHIO RULES OF COURT (1986); OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
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(b) There shall be no expanded media coverage of any court pro-
ceeding which, under the laws of the state of are 
required to be held in private. Additionally, no such coverage 
shall be permitted in any cases involving sex crimes, juvenile 
proceedings, marriage dissolution, adoption, child custody, 
motions to suppress evidence, police informants, undercover 
agents, and trade secrets, unless consent on the record is ob-
tained from all parties (including the parent or guardian of a 
minor child).212 
(Ill) LIAISON 
The Administrative Director of the Courts shall maintain commu-
nication and liaison with media representatives so as to insure smooth 
working relationships. 213 
(IV) LIMITATIONS ON EXPANDED COVERAGE 
(a) Notwithstanding an authorization to conduct expanded media 
coverage of a proceeding, there shall be no expanded media 
coverage of 
1. communications between counsel and client or co-counsel; 
2. bench conferences; 
3. in camera hearings; 
4. communications between judges in appellate proceedings; 
5. members of the jury at any time, including voir dire;214 
6. hearings that take place outside the presence of the jury. 
(b) No witness who expresses to the judge any prior objection 
shall be photographed by any camera, nor shall the testimony 
of such a witness be broadcast or telecast. 2 15 
Canon 3A(7)(b) in OKLA. COURT RULES AND PROCEDURE (1985-86); TENN. CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(c) in TENN. RULES OF COURT (1985). 
212. See notes 138-56 supra and accompanying text. For similar state provisions, see, for 
example, In re Arkansas Bar Assn., 271 Ark. 358, 362-65, 609 S.W.2d 28, 30-31 (1980), modi-
fied, In re Modification of Code of Judicial Conduct Relating to Broadcasting & Photographing 
Court Proceedings, 275 Ark. 495, 628 S.W.2d 573 (1982); CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3A(7A)(4) in CONN. RULES OF COURT (1986); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3A(7)2(d) in IOWA RULES OF COURT (1985); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3A(7)(2)(b & c) in N.C. RULES OF COURT (1985) (temporary). 
213. See, e.g., HAWAII CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 19.l(e) in RULES OF COURT: THE 
JUDICIARY OF HAWAII (1983); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)3(a) in IOWA 
RULES OF COURT (1985); TENN. CooE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7), Media Guidelines 
3 & 4 in TENN. RULES OF CoURT (1985). 
214. See, e.g., CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 3A(7A)(6 & 7), in CONN. RULES OF 
COURT (1986); HAWAII CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT 19.l(g)(2 & 3), in RULES OF COURT: 
THE JUDICIARY OF HAWAII (1983); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)2(e & f) 
in IOWA RULES OF COURT (1985); In re Canon 3A(7), 9 Media L. Rptr. 1778, 1779 (Minn. 
1984); see also notes 125-37 supra and accompanying text. 
215. See, e.g., GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(c)(ii), in GA. COURT RULES 
AND PROCEDURE (1986); KAN. RULES RELATING TO JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(c)(ii) 
in KAN. CoURT RULES AND PROCEDURE (1986); Mo. COURT RULES AND JUDICIAL CANONS 
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( c) There shall be no expanded media coverage within the court-
room during the recesses or at any other time in which the trial 
judge is not present and presiding. 
(V) AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE R.EsTRICTIONS ON EXPANDED MEDIA 
COVERAGE 
In authorizing expanded media coverage, a judge may impose such 
restrictions or limitations as may be necessary to preserve the dignity 
of the court and to protect the parties, witnesses, and jurors. A judge 
may terminate expanded media coverage at any time upon a finding 
that 
1. rules established herein or additional rules imposed by the 
judge have been violated; or 
2. substantial rights of individual participants or rights to a 
fair trial will be prejudiced by such coverage if it is allowed 
to continue.216 
(VI) PROCEDURE 
(a) Prior request for permission and notice. Requests for permis-
sion for expanded media coverage in the courtroom shall be 
made in writing at least ten days before the proceedings are 
scheduled to begin, unless such time is reduced or extended by 
court order upon a showing of good cause. The attorneys of 
record shall be notified by the Court Administrator or by the 
Clerk of the Court at least seven days in advance of the time 
the proceedings are scheduled to begin unless such time is re-
duced or extended by court order. The written permission of 
the judge shall be made a part of the record of the 
proceedings. 217 
(b) Objections. A party to a proceeding objecting to expanded me-
dia coverage shall file a written objection, stating the grounds 
therefore, at least three days before commencement of the pro-
ceeding. All witnesses shall be advised by counsel proposing to 
introduce their testimony of their right to object to expanded 
media coverage of their testimony and all objections shall be 
filed prior to commencement of the proceeding. 
Rule 1209(e)(i) (1984); In re Canon 3A(7), 9 Media L. Rptr. 1778, 1779 (Minn. 1984); Omo 
CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(c)(iii) in OHIO RULES OF COURT (1986); OKLA. 
CoDE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(c) in OKLA. COURT RULES AND PROCEDURE 
(1985-86). 
216. See, e.g., COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(8)(b) in COLO. COURT RULES 
(1984); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)2(h) in IOWA RULES OF COURT 
(1985). 
~17. See, e.g., IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 3A(7)3(b) in IOWA RULES OP 
COURT (1985); see also notes 157-60 supra and accompanying text. 
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All objections shall be heard and determined by the judge 
prior to commencement of the proceedings. Time for filing of 
objections may be extended or reduced at the discretion of the 
judge. A criminal defendant shall be entitled to an immediate 
appeal of a decision to ·permit televising. 21s 
(VII) LIMITATIONS ON BROADCASTING 
(a) Film, videotape, photography and audio reproductions may 
not be used for advertising purposes. 
(b) Television broadcasters must present balanced coverage of the 
prosecution and the defense. 
(c) None of the film, videotape, still photographs or audio repro-
ductions developed during, or by virtue of, coverage of a judi-
cial proceeding shall be admissible as evidence in the 
proceeding out of which it arose, any proceeding subsequent or 
collateral thereto, or upon any retrial or appeal of such 
proceeding.219 
(VIII) MEDIA PERSONNEL 
Media representatives shall conduct themselves in a manner con-
sistent with the decorum and dignity of the courtroom. The following 
practices shall be observed in this regard: 
(a) Media representatives shall present a neat appearance in keep-
ing with the dignity of the proceedings. 
(b) Personnel shall not wear clothing bearing any insignia or iden-
tifi.cation of the individual or network involved. Identifying 
marks, call letters, logos, symbols and legends shall be con-
cealed on all equipment. 
( c) Media representatives shall not move about the court facility 
while proceedings are in session.220 
Comment: 
If the judge believes that the appearance and position of media person-
nel in the courtroom might mislead the jury into thinking that the 
media personnel are officers of the court, the judge should instruct the 
jury that they are not associated with the court in any official manner. 
218. See IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)3(c) in IOWA RULES OF COURT 
(1985); see also notes 161-72 supra and accompanying text. 
219. See, e.g., In re Canon 3A(7), 9 Media L. Rptr. 1778, 1781 (Minn. 1984); see also notes 
173-85 supra and accompanying text. 
220. See, e.g., CAL. C1v. & CRIM. CT. R. 980(b)(3) (West 1979); COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 3A(8)(e)(III) in CoLO. CoURT RULES (1984); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CON-
DUCT Canon 3A(7)4(e & f) in IOWA RULES OF COURT (1985); Mo. CoURT RULES AND JUDI-
CIAL CANONS Rule 1209(f)(10) (1984); In re Canon 3A(7), 9 Media L. Rptr. 1778, 1780 (Minn. 
1984); PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(c)(i) in PA. RULES OF COURT (1986). 
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(IX) EQUIPMENT 
Expanded media coverage shall be conducted only under the fol-
lowing conditions: 
(a) Equipment specifications. Equipment must be unobtrusive and 
must not produce distracting sounds. In addition, such equip-
ment must satisfy the following criteria: 
1. Television cameras and related equipment. 
(a) Not more than one portable television camera [film 
camera - 16 mm sound on film (self blimped) or 
video-tape electronic camera], operated by not more 
than one person, shall be permitted in any trial court 
proceeding. 
(b) Television cameras are to be designed or modified so 
that participants in the judicial proceeding are unable 
to determine when recording is occurring. 
(c) Where possible, recording and broadcasting equipment 
that is not a component part of a television camera 
shall be located outside of the courtroom. 
( d) The camera operators shall remain in a single location 
throughout the proceeding. 
(e) No artificial lighting device of any kind shall be em-
ployed in connection with the television camera. 
2. Audio. The court's audio system shall be used if techni-
cally feasible and, in that event, the media will ensure that 
they do not interfere with the court's use of the system. If 
the court's system is not technically suitable, then all audio 
recording shall be done on one audio system installed by 
the media at their own expense. All microphones and re-
lated wiring shall be unobtrusive and shall not interfere 
with the movement of those in the courtroom. Micro-
phones for use of counsel and judges shall be equipped 
with on/off switches. Where possible, electronic audio re-
cording equipment and any operating personnel shall be 
located outside of the courtroom. 
3. Still Cameras. All photographs shall be taken by one still 
photographer using an unobtrustive tripod and using not 
more than two still cameras. The photographer shall re-
main in a single location throughout the proceeding. Such 
still camera equipment shall produce no greater sound or 
light than a 35 mm Leica "M" Series Rangefinder camera, 
and no artificial lighting device of any kind shall be em-
ployed in connection with a still camera. 
4. Lighting. No movie lights, flash attachments, or sudden 
lighting changes shall be permitted during a proceeding. 
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No modification or addition of lighting equipment shall be 
permitted without the permission of the judge. 
5. Operating Signals. No visible or audible light or signal 
(tally light) shall be used on any equipment. 
6. In proceedings involving a jury, all equipment and person-
nel must be present during the entirety of the proceeding. 
7. It shall be the affirmative duty of media personnel to 
demonstrate to the judge adequately in advance of any pro-
ceeding that the equipment sought to be utilized meets the 
sound and light criteria described herein. A failure to ob-
tain advance judicial approval for equipment shall preclude 
its use in any proceeding. 
8. All equipment shall be in place and tested fifteen minutes 
in advance of the time the court is called to order and shall 
be placed in an unobtrusive or hidden location designated 
by the judge. 
9. Equipment involved in expanded media coverage shall not 
be placed in, or removed from, the courtroom except prior 
to commencement or after adjournment of proceedings 
each day, or during a recess. Neither television film, 
magazines, video cassettes, nor still camera film or lenses 
shall be changed within a courtroom except during a recess 
in the proceedings.221 
(b) Pooling arrangements. The media shall be solely responsible 
for designating one media representative to conduct each of 
the categories of expanded media coverage listed in subsection 
(I) of this section, and for arranging an open and impartial 
distribution scheme with a distribution point located outside 
the courtroom. If no agreement can be reached on either of 
these matters, then there shall be no expanded media coverage. 
Neither judges nor other court personnel shall be called upon 
to resolve any disputes that may arise in this connection.222 
221. See, e.g., In re Arkansas Bar Assn., 271 Ark. 358, 363-64, 609 S.W.2d 28, 31 (1980); 
CAL. C1v. & CRIM. Cr. R. 980(b)(3) (West 1979); COLO. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 
3A(8)(e)(I) in COLO. COURT RULES (1984); CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 3A(7A)(9-ll) 
in CONN. RULES OF COURT (1986); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)4(a & b) 
in IOWA RULES OF COURT (1985); Mo. CoURT RULES AND JUDICIAL CANONS Rule 1209(f) 
(1984); OKLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 3A(7)(f) in OKLA. COURT RULES AND 
PROCEDURE (1985-86); TENN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7), Media Guidelines 3-
10 in TENN. RULES OF COURT (1985); see also notes 186-89 supra and accompanying text. 
222. See, e.g., CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7A)(12) in CONN. RULES OF 
COURT (1986); FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDUCT Canon 3A(7), Standards of Conduct and 
Technology l(d) in FLA. RULES OF COURT (1984); HAWAII CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
19.l(h)(4) in RULES OF THE COURT: THE JUDICIARY OF HAWAII (1983); In re Canon 3A(7), 9 
Media L. Rptr. 1778, 1780 (Minn. 1984); N.C. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3A(7)(5)(d) 
in N.C. RULES OF CoURT (1985); OR. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canori 3A(8)(a)'(iv) (1983) 
(temporary). 
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(X) AGREEMENT OF MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES 
All persons who request and are granted permission to cover a ju-
dicial proceeding are subject to this plan and agree to abide by its 
provisions. 223 
- Nancy T. Gardner 
223. See In re Canon 3A(7), 5 MEDIA L. REP. 2494, 2496 (Alaska 1979). 
